The Enneads

The Enneads · Plotinus

Ennead 4, Tractate 2: On the Essence of the Soul II, Section 1

Translated by Stephen MacKenna (1917–1930) · 251 of 654

1. In our attempt to elucidate the Essence of the soul, we show it to be neither a material fabric nor, among immaterial things, a harmony. The theory that it is some final development, some entelechy, we pass by, holding this to be neither true as presented nor practically definitive.

No doubt we make a very positive statement about it when we declare it to belong to the Intellectual Kind, to be of the divine order; but a deeper penetration of its nature is demanded.

In that allocation we were distinguishing things as they fall under the Intellectual or the sensible, and we placed the soul in the former class; now, taking its membership of the Intellectual for granted, we must investigate by another path the more specific characteristics of its nature.

There are, we hold, things primarily apt to partition, tending by sheer nature towards separate existence: they are things in which no part is identical either with another part or with the whole, while, also their part is necessarily less than the total and whole: these are magnitudes of the realm of sense, masses, each of which has a station of its own so that none can be identically present in entirety at more than one point at one time.

But to that order is opposed Essence [Real-Being]; this is in no degree susceptible of partition; it is unparted and impartible; interval is foreign to it, cannot enter into our idea of it: it has no need of place and is not, in diffusion or as an entirety, situated within any other being: it is poised over all beings at once, and this is not in the sense of using them as a base but in their being neither capable nor desirous of existing independently of it; it is an essence eternally unvaried: it is common to all that follows upon it: it is like the circle's centre to which all the radii are attached while leaving it unbrokenly in possession of itself, the starting point of their course and of their essential being, the ground in which they all participate: thus the indivisible is the principle of these divided existences and in their very outgoing they remain enduringly in contact with that stationary essence.

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So far we have the primarily indivisible- supreme among the Intellectual and Authentically Existent- and we have its contrary, the Kind definitely divisible in things of sense; but there is also another Kind, of earlier rank than the sensible yet near to it and resident within it- an order, not, like body, primarily a thing of part, but becoming so upon incorporation. The bodies are separate, and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a permanent identity; we may think of colour, qualities of all kinds, some particular shape, which can be present in many unrelated objects at the one moment, each entire and yet with no community of experience among the various manifestations. In the case of such ideal-forms we may affirm complete partibility.

But, on the other hand, that first utterly indivisible Kind must be accompanied by a subsequent Essence, engendered by it and holding indivisibility from it but, in virtue of the necessary outgo from source, tending firmly towards the contrary, the wholly partible; this secondary Essence will take an intermediate Place between the first substance, the undivided, and that which is divisible in material things and resides in them. Its presence, however, will differ in one respect from that of colour and quantity; these, no doubt, are present identically and entire throughout diverse material masses, but each several manifestation of them is as distinct from every other as the mass is from the mass.

The magnitude present in any mass is definitely one thing, yet its identity from part to part does not imply any such community as would entail common experience; within that identity there is diversity, for it is a condition only, not the actual Essence.

The Essence, very near to the impartible, which we assert to belong to the Kind we are now dealing with, is at once an Essence and an entrant into body; upon embodiment, it experiences a partition unknown before it thus bestowed itself.

In whatsoever bodies it occupies- even the vastest of all, that in which the entire universe is included- it gives itself to the whole without abdicating its unity.

This unity of an Essence is not like that of body, which is a unit by the mode of continuous extension, the mode of distinct parts each occupying its own space. Nor is it such a unity as we have dealt with in the case of quality.

The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be soul has not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part.

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To have penetrated this idea is to know the greatness of the soul and its power, the divinity and wonder of its being, as a nature transcending the sphere of Things.

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Itself devoid of mass, it is present to all mass: it exists here and yet is There, and this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity: thus it is "parted and not parted," or, better, it has never known partition, never become a parted thing, but remains a self-gathered integral, and is "parted among bodies" merely in the sense that bodies, in virtue of their own sundered existence, cannot receive it unless in some partitive mode; the partition, in other words, is an occurrence in body not in soul.

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Ennead 4, Tractate 2: On the Essence of the Soul II, Section 2

2. It can be demonstrated that soul must, necessarily, be of just this nature and that there can be no other soul than such a being, one neither wholly partible but both at once.

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Contents

The Enneads · Plotinus

654 chapters

  1. 01Porphyry: On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his Work39 min
  2. 02Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 11 min
  3. 03Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 22 min
  4. 04Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 32 min
  5. 05Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 42 min
  6. 06Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 53 min
  7. 07Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 61 min
  8. 08Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 72 min
  9. 09Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 82 min
  10. 10Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 92 min
  11. 11Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 101 min
  12. 12Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 111 min
  13. 13Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 123 min
  14. 14Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 131 min
  15. 15Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 14 min
  16. 16Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 22 min
  17. 17Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 32 min
  18. 18Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 42 min
  19. 19Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 52 min
  20. 20Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 63 min
  21. 21Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 72 min
  22. 22Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 13 min
  23. 23Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 21 min
  24. 24Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 31 min
  25. 25Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 42 min
  26. 26Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 52 min
  27. 27Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 62 min
  28. 28Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 12 min
  29. 29Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 24 min
  30. 30Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 33 min
  31. 31Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 43 min
  32. 32Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 52 min
  33. 33Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 62 min
  34. 34Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 73 min
  35. 35Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 82 min
  36. 36Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 92 min
  37. 37Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 102 min
  38. 38Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 111 min
  39. 39Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 121 min
  40. 40Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 131 min
  41. 41Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 142 min
  42. 42Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 152 min
  43. 43Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 162 min
  44. 44Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 11 min
  45. 45Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 21 min
  46. 46Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 31 min
  47. 47Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 41 min
  48. 48Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 51 min
  49. 49Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 62 min
  50. 50Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 72 min
  51. 51Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 81 min
  52. 52Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 91 min
  53. 53Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 102 min
  54. 54Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 13 min
  55. 55Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 22 min
  56. 56Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 32 min
  57. 57Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 42 min
  58. 58Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 54 min
  59. 59Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 62 min
  60. 60Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 73 min