The Enneads

The Enneads · Plotinus

Ennead 4, Tractate 3: On Difficulties about the Soul I, Section 26

Translated by Stephen MacKenna (1917–1930) · 278 of 654

26. Now if sensations of the active order depend upon the Couplement of soul and body, sensation must be of that double nature. Hence it is classed as one of the shared acts: the soul, in the feeling, may be compared to the workman in such operations as boring or weaving, the body to the tool employed: the body is passive and menial; the soul is active, reading such impressions as are made upon the body or discerned by means of the body, perhaps entertaining only a judgement formed as the result of the bodily experiences.

In such a process it is at once clear that the sensation is a shared task; but the memory is not thus made over to the Couplement, since the soul has from the first taken over the impression, either to retain or to reject.

It might be ventured that memory, no less than sensation, is a function of the Couplement, on the ground that bodily constitution determines our memories good or bad; but the answer would come that, whether the body happens or not to be a hindrance, the act of remembering would still be an act of the soul. And in the case of matters learned [and not merely felt, as corporeal experiences], how can we think of the Couplement of soul and body as the remembering principle? Here, surely, it must be soul alone?

We may be told that the living-being is a Couplement in the sense of something entirely distinct formed from the two elements [so that it might have memory though neither soul nor body had it]. But, to begin with, it is absurd to class the living-being as neither body nor soul; these two things cannot so change as to make a distinct third, nor can they blend so utterly that the soul shall become a mere faculty of the animate whole. And, further, supposing they could so blend, memory would still be due to the soul just as in honey-wine all the sweetness will be due to the honey.

It may be suggested the while the soul is perhaps not in itself a remembering principle, yet that, having lost its purity and acquired some degree of modification by its presence in body, it becomes capable of reproducing the imprints of sensible objects and experiences, and that, seated, as roughly speaking it is, within the body, it may reasonably be thought capable of accepting such impressions, and in such a manner as to retain them [thus in some sense possessing memory].

But, to begin with, these imprints are not magnitudes [are not of corporeal nature at all]; there is no resemblance to seal impressions, no stamping of a resistant matter, for there is neither the down-thrust [as of the seal] nor [the acceptance] as in the wax: the process is entirely of the intellect, though exercised upon things of sense; and what kind of resistance [or other physical action] can be affirmed in matters of the intellectual order, or what need can there be of body or bodily quality as a means?

Further there is one order of which the memory must obviously belong to the soul; it alone can remember its own movements, for example its desires and those frustrations of desire in which the coveted thing never came to the body: the body can have nothing to tell about things which never approached it, and the soul cannot use the body as a means to the remembrance of what the body by its nature cannot know.

If the soul is to have any significance- to be a definite principle with a function of its own- we are forced to recognize two orders of fact, an order in which the body is a means but all culminates in soul, and an order which is of the soul alone. This being admitted, aspiration will belong to soul, and so, as a consequence, will that memory of the aspiration and of its attainment or frustration, without which the soul's nature would fall into the category of the unstable [that is to say of the undivine, unreal]. Deny this character of the soul and at once we refuse it perception, consciousness, any power of comparison, almost any understanding. Yet these powers of which, embodied it becomes the source cannot be absent from its own nature. On the contrary; it possesses certain activities to be expressed in various functions whose accomplishment demands bodily organs; at its entry it brings with it [as vested in itself alone] the powers necessary for some of these functions, while in the case of others it brings the very activities themselves.

Memory, in point of fact, is impeded by the body: even as things are, addition often brings forgetfulness; with thinning and dearing away, memory will often revive. The soul is a stability; the shifting and fleeting thing which body is can be a cause only of its forgetting not of its remembering- Lethe stream may be understood in this sense- and memory is a fact of the soul.

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Ennead 4, Tractate 3: On Difficulties about the Soul I, Section 27

27. But of what soul; of that which we envisage as the more divine, by which we are human beings, or that other which springs from the All?

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Contents

The Enneads · Plotinus

654 chapters

  1. 01Porphyry: On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his Work39 min
  2. 02Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 11 min
  3. 03Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 22 min
  4. 04Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 32 min
  5. 05Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 42 min
  6. 06Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 53 min
  7. 07Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 61 min
  8. 08Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 72 min
  9. 09Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 82 min
  10. 10Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 92 min
  11. 11Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 101 min
  12. 12Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 111 min
  13. 13Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 123 min
  14. 14Ennead 1, Tractate 1: On the Animate and the Man, Section 131 min
  15. 15Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 14 min
  16. 16Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 22 min
  17. 17Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 32 min
  18. 18Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 42 min
  19. 19Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 52 min
  20. 20Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 63 min
  21. 21Ennead 1, Tractate 2: On Virtue, Section 72 min
  22. 22Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 13 min
  23. 23Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 21 min
  24. 24Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 31 min
  25. 25Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 42 min
  26. 26Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 52 min
  27. 27Ennead 1, Tractate 3: On Dialectic, the Upward Way, Section 62 min
  28. 28Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 12 min
  29. 29Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 24 min
  30. 30Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 33 min
  31. 31Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 43 min
  32. 32Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 52 min
  33. 33Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 62 min
  34. 34Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 73 min
  35. 35Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 82 min
  36. 36Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 92 min
  37. 37Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 102 min
  38. 38Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 111 min
  39. 39Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 121 min
  40. 40Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 131 min
  41. 41Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 142 min
  42. 42Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 152 min
  43. 43Ennead 1, Tractate 4: On True Happiness, Section 162 min
  44. 44Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 11 min
  45. 45Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 21 min
  46. 46Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 31 min
  47. 47Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 41 min
  48. 48Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 51 min
  49. 49Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 62 min
  50. 50Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 72 min
  51. 51Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 81 min
  52. 52Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 91 min
  53. 53Ennead 1, Tractate 5: On Whether Well-Being Increases with Time, Section 102 min
  54. 54Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 13 min
  55. 55Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 22 min
  56. 56Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 32 min
  57. 57Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 42 min
  58. 58Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 54 min
  59. 59Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 62 min
  60. 60Ennead 1, Tractate 6: On Beauty, Section 73 min