The Mahabharata

The Mahabharata · Vyasa

Shanti Parva: Section 260

Translated by K.M. Ganguli (1883-1896) · 1681 of 2097

"Yudhishthira said, 'Thou sayest that righteousness or duty depends upon delicate considerations, that is indicated by the conduct of those that are called good, that it is fraught with restraints (from numerous acts), and that its indications are also contained in the Vedas. It seems to me, however, that I have a certain inward light in consequence of which I can discriminate between right and wrong by inferences. Numerous questions that I had intended to ask thee have all been answered by thee. There is one question, however, that I shall presently ask. It is not prompted, O king, by desire of empty disputation. All these embodied creatures, it seems, take birth, exist, and leave their bodies, of their own nature. Duty and its reverse, therefore, cannot be ascertained, O Bharata, by study of the scriptures alone. The duties of a person who is well off are of one kind. Those of a person who has fallen into distress are of another kind. How can duty respecting seasons of distress be ascertained by reading the scriptures alone? The acts of the good, thou hast said, constitute righteousness (or duty). The good, however, are to be ascertained by their acts. The definition, therefore, has for its foundation, a begging of the question, with the result that what is meant by conduct of the good remains unsettled. It is seen that some ordinary person commits unrighteousness while apparently achieving righteousness. Some extraordinary persons again may be seen who achieve righteousness by committing acts that are apparently unrighteous. Then, again, the proof (of what I say) has been furnished by even those that are well conversant with the scriptures themselves, for it has been heard by us that the ordinances of the Vedas disappear gradually in every successive age. The duties in the Krita age are of one kind. Those in the Treta are of another kind, and those in the Dwapara are again different. The duties in the Kali age, again, are entirely of another kind.

It seems, therefore, that duties have been laid down for the respective ages according to the powers of human beings in the respective ages. When, therefore, all the declarations in the Vedas do not apply equally to all the ages, the saying that the declarations of the Vedas are true is only a popular form of speech indulged in for popular satisfaction. From the Srutis have originated the Smritis whose scope again is very wide. If the Vedas be authority for everything, then authority would attach to the Smritis also for the latter are based on the former. When, however, the Srutis and the Smritis contradict each other, how can either be authoritative? Then again, it is seen that when some wicked persons of great might cause certain portions of certain courses of righteous acts to be stopped, these are destroyed for ever. Whether we know it or know it not, whether we are able to ascertain it or not to ascertain it, the course of duty is finer than the edge of a razor and grosser than even a mountain. Righteousness (in the form of sacrifices and other religious acts) at first appears in the form of the romantic edifices of vapour seen in the distant sky. When, however, it is examined by the learned, it disappears and becomes invisible. Like the small ponds at which the cattle drink or the shallow aqueducts along cultivated fields that dry up very soon, the eternal practices inculcated in the Smritis, falling into discontinuance, at last disappear totally (in the Kali age). Amongst men that are not good some are seen to become hypocrites (in respect of the acquisition of righteousness) by suffering themselves to be urged by desire. Some become so, urged by the wishes of others. Others, numbering many, tread in the same path, influenced by diverse other motives of a similar character. It cannot be denied that such acts (though accomplished by persons under the influence of evil passions) are righteous.

What a scale-holder's name revealsMembership note · Open in the app

Fools, again, say that righteousness is an empty sound among those called good. They ridicule such persons and regard them as men destitute of reason. Many great men, again, turning back (from the duties of their own order) betake themselves to the duties of the kingly order. No such conduct, therefore, is to be seen (as observed by any man), which is fraught with universal benevolence. By a certain course of conduct one becomes really meritorious. That very course of conduct obstructs another in the acquisition of merit. Another, by practising at his pleasure that conduct, it is seen, remains unchanged. Thus that conduct by which one becomes meritorious impedes another in the acquisition of merit. One may thus see that all courses of conduct are seen to lose singleness of purpose and character. It seems, therefore, that only that which the learned of ancient times called righteousness is righteousness to this day: and through that course of conduct (which the learned so settled) the distinctions and limitations (that govern the world) have become eternal.'"

The pride that hides inside penanceMembership note · Open in the app

Footnotes 228:1 I am not sure that I have understood the original correctly. Nilakantha says that the sense intended to be conveyed is that Yudhishthira finds fault with Bhishma's previous course on the indications of righteousness.

228:2 The argument, as explained by the commentator is this: Bhishma has said that righteousness and its reverse arise from one's acts producing happiness or misery to others, and that they both affect one's future life in respect to the happiness and misery enjoyed or endured therein. But living creatures, says Yudhishthira, are seen to take their births, exist, and die, of their own nature. Nature, therefore, seems to be the efficient cause of birth, existence, and death, and not the declarations in the Srutis, consistent though those declarations be with considerations of felicity or the reverse. The study of the Vedas, therefore, cannot alone lead to a knowledge of righteousness and its reverse.

228:3 Distress may be of infinite variety. Derogation also from duty may, therefore, be of infinite variety. It is impossible to note these derogations (justifiable in view of the degree of distress felt) in any code of morals, however comprehensive.

228:4 The commentator cites the example of Sudras listening to forbidden scriptures in expectation of merit. They commit sin by such acts. Then again high Brahmanas like Agastya, by cursing the denizens of the Dandaka forest, achieved great merit. In persons universally called ordinary or even low, indications are observable of good behaviour, and in those acknowledged to be good and respectable, acts may be noticed that are not good. That therefore, which is called the conduct of the good is extremely unascertainable.

229:1 The commentator cites the instance of the stoppage of the Horse-sacrifice in consequence of the interference of Indra with Janamejaya while the latter was bent upon celebrating one for the acquisition of merit.

229:2 The vapoury edifices and forms seen in the distant sky are called Gandharva-nagara from the peculiar belief that they are cities or towns inhabited by the Gandharvas, a class of beings superior to men. They appear to the view only to disappear very soon. What the speaker wishes to say is that sacrifices and religious acts at first appear romantic and delightful in consequence of the fruits they hold forth, viz., heaven and felicity. But when they are examined by the light of philosophy, they disappear or shrink into nothingness, for as acts, they are transitory and their consequences too are of the same character.

229:3 The object of this verse is to show that it is extremely difficult to ascertain who the good are whose conduct should be taken as the standard of righteousness.

229:4 The commentator cites the instance of Drona and others of that class. These men must be regarded as Mahajanas and Sadhus, but how can their conduct be regarded as righteous? What Yudhishthira means to say is that the standards of righteousness or that by which a good man may be known, is difficult of ascertainment.

229:5 The example of Viswamitra, Jamadagnya, and Vasishtha are cited by the commentator. The first won pre-eminence by his mastery over weapons. The second lost his character as a Brahmana by the profession of arms. The third lost nothing although he punished Viswamitra's insolence by using even carnal weapons.

230:1 What Yudhishthira says here is that righteousness or virtue or duty does not depend upon the Srutis or the Smritis, nor upon considerations of happiness or misery. On the other hand, righteousness is arbitrary in respect of its standard, that being called righteous which was called so by the learned of ancient times. As regards happiness or misery, its cause is eternal nature.

Up next

Shanti Parva: Section 261

"Bhishma said, 'In this connection is cited the old narrative of the conversation of Tuladhara with Jajali on the topic of righteousness.

About 8 min to read

Take your library with you

Continue to the next chapter

Open the next chapter in the app. Reading is free.

Scan to open the next chapter

Every book is free to read. Downloading the app may not keep this chapter link; return here to open it after installing.

Contents

The Mahabharata · Vyasa

2097 chapters

  1. 01Translator's Preface41 min
  2. 02Adi Parva: Section 238 min
  3. 03Adi Parva: Section 327 min
  4. 04Adi Parva: Section 42 min
  5. 05Adi Parva: Section 54 min
  6. 06Adi Parva: Section 62 min
  7. 07Adi Parva: Section 74 min
  8. 08Adi Parva: Section 83 min
  9. 09Adi Parva: Section 93 min
  10. 10Adi Parva: Section 102 min
  11. 11Adi Parva: Section 112 min
  12. 12Adi Parva: Section 121 min
  13. 13Adi Parva: Section 134 min
  14. 14Adi Parva: Section 141 min
  15. 15Adi Parva: Section 152 min
  16. 16Adi Parva: Section 163 min
  17. 17Adi Parva: Section 172 min
  18. 18Adi Parva: Section 185 min
  19. 19Adi Parva: Section 194 min
  20. 20Adi Parva: Section 202 min
  21. 21Adi Parva: Section 213 min
  22. 22Adi Parva: Section 222 min
  23. 23Adi Parva: Section 235 min
  24. 24Adi Parva: Section 243 min
  25. 25Adi Parva: Section 253 min
  26. 26Adi Parva: Section 261 min
  27. 27Adi Parva: Section 273 min
  28. 28Adi Parva: Section 283 min
  29. 29Adi Parva: Section 296 min
  30. 30Adi Parva: Section 306 min
  31. 31Adi Parva: Section 315 min
  32. 32Adi Parva: Section 323 min
  33. 33Adi Parva: Section 333 min
  34. 34Adi Parva: Section 344 min
  35. 35Adi Parva: Section 352 min
  36. 36Adi Parva: Section 364 min
  37. 37Adi Parva: Section 374 min
  38. 38Adi Parva: Section 383 min
  39. 39Adi Parva: Section 392 min
  40. 40Adi Parva: Section 404 min
  41. 41Adi Parva: Section 414 min
  42. 42Adi Parva: Section 425 min
  43. 43Adi Parva: Section 434 min
  44. 44Adi Parva: Section 442 min
  45. 45Adi Parva: Section 454 min
  46. 46Adi Parva: Section 463 min
  47. 47Adi Parva: Section 475 min
  48. 48Adi Parva: Section 483 min
  49. 49Adi Parva: Section 494 min
  50. 50Adi Parva: Section 506 min
  51. 51Adi Parva: Section 512 min
  52. 52Adi Parva: Section 522 min
  53. 53Adi Parva: Section 533 min
  54. 54Adi Parva: Section 544 min
  55. 55Adi Parva: Section 553 min
  56. 56Adi Parva: Section 564 min
  57. 57Adi Parva: Section 573 min
  58. 58Adi Parva: Section 584 min
  59. 59Adi Parva: Section 592 min
  60. 60Adi Parva: Section 603 min