Yoga as philosophy and religion · 6 of 17

Book I — Chapter V: The Evolution of the Categories

The Yoga analysis points to the fact that all our cognitive states are distinguished from their objects by the fact of their being intelligent. This intelligence is the constant factor which persists amidst all changes of our cognitive states. We are passing continually from one state to another without any rest, but in this varying change of these states we are never divested of intelligence. This fact of intelligence is therefore neither the particular possession of any one of these states nor that of the sum of these states; for if it is not the possession of any one of these states it cannot be the possession of the sum of these states. In the case of the released person again there is no mental state, but the self-shining intelligence. So Yoga regarded this intelligence as quite distinct from the so-called mental states which became intelligent by coming in connection with this intelligence. The actionless, absolutely pure and simple intelligence it called the purusha.

Yoga tacitly assumed a certain kind of analysis of the nature of these mental states which sought to find out, if possible, the nature of their constituent elements or moments of existence. Now in analysing the different states of our mind we find that a particular content of thought is illuminated and then passed over. The ideas rise, are illuminated and pass away. Thus they found that “movement” was one of the principal elements that constituted the substance of our thoughts. Thought as such is always moving. This principle of movement, mutation or change, this energy, they called rajas.

Now apart from this rajas, thought when seen as divested of its sensuous contents seems to exhibit one universal mould or form of knowledge which assumes the form of all the sensuous contents that are presented to it. It is the one universal of all our particular concepts or ideas—the basis or substratum of all the different shapes imposed upon itself, the pure and simple. Sattva in which there is no particularity is that element of our thought which, resembling purusha most, can attain its reflection within itself and thus makes the unconscious mental states intelligible. All the contents of our thought are but modes and limitations of this universal form and are thus made intelligible. It is the one principle of intelligibility of all our conscious states.

Now our intellectual life consists in a series of shining ideas or concepts; concepts after concepts shine forth in the light of the pure intelligence and pass away. But each concept is but a limitation of the pure shining universal of our knowledge which underlies all its changing modes or modifications of concepts or judgments. This is what is called pure knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known. This pure object—subjectless knowledge differs from the pure intelligence or purusha only in this that later on it is liable to suffer various modifications, as the ego, the senses, and the infinite percepts and concepts, etc., connected therewith, whereas the pure intelligence remains ever pure and changeless and is never the substratum of any change. At this stage sattva, the intelligence-stuff, is prominent and rajas and tamas are altogether suppressed. It is for this reason that the buddhi or mind is often spoken of as the sattva. Being an absolute preponderance of sattva it has nothing else to manifest, but it is its pure-shining self. 50 Both tamas and rajas being mostly suppressed they cannot in any way affect the effulgent nature of this pure shining of contentless knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known.

But it must be remembered that it is holding suspended as it were within itself the elements of rajas and tamas which cannot manifest themselves owing to the preponderance of the sattva.

This notion of pure contentless consciousness is immediate and abstract and as such is at once mediated by other necessary phases. Thus we see that this pure contentless universal consciousness is the same as the ego-universal ( asmitāmātra ). For this contentless universal consciousness is only another name for the contentless unlimited, infinite of the ego-universal. A quotation from Fichte may here be useful as a comparison. Thus he says in the introduction to his Science of Ethics : “How an object can ever become a subject, or how a being can ever become an object of representation: this curious change will never be explained by anyone who does not find a point where the objective and subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now such a point is established by, and made the starting point of our system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever it may be named.” [26] The Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19, describes it as liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani, and again in I. 36 we find it described as the waveless ocean, peaceful infinite pure egohood. This obscure egohood is known merely as being. This mahat has also been spoken of by Vijñāna Bhikshu as the manas, or mind, as it has the function of assimilation ( niścaya ). Now what we have already said about mahat will, we hope, make it clear that this mahat is the last limit at which the subject and the object can be considered as one indistinguishable point which is neither the one nor the other, but the source of both.

This buddhi is thus variously called mahat, asmitāmātra, manas, sattva, buddhi and liṅga, according to the aspects from which this state is observed.

This state is called mahat as it is the most universal thing conceivable and the one common source from which all other things originate.

Now this phase of sattva or pure shining naturally passes into the other phase, that of the Ego as knower or Ego as subject. The first phase as mahat or asmitāmātra was the state in which the sattva was predominant and the rajas and tamas were in a suppressed condition. The next moment is that in which the rajas comes uppermost, and thus the ego as the subject of all cognition—the subject I—the knower of all the mental states—is derived. The contentless subject-objectless “I” is the passive sattva aspect of the buddhi catching the reflection of the spirit of purusha.

In its active aspect, however, it feels itself one with the spirit and appears as the ego or subject which knows, feels and wills. Thus Patañjali says, in II. 6: dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā, i.e. the seeming identity of the seer and the perceiving capacity is called asmitā-ego. Again in Bhāshya, I. 17, we have ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā (knowledge as one identical is asmitā) which Vācaspati explains as sā ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid, i.e. it is the feeling of identity of the buddhi (mind) with the self, the perceiver. Thus we find that the mind is affected by its own rajas or activity and posits itself as the ego or subject as activity. By reason of this position of the “I” as active it perceives itself in the objective, in all its conative and cognitive senses in its thoughts and feelings and also in the external world of extension and co-existence; in the words of Pañcaśikha (II. 5) thinking the animate and inanimate beings to be the self, man regards their prosperity as his own and becomes glad, and regards their adversity as his own and is sorry. Here the “I” is posited as the active entity which becomes conscious of itself, or in other words the “I” becomes self-conscious. In analysing this notion of self-consciousness we find that here the rajas or element of activity or mobility has become predominant and this predominance of rajas has been manifested by the inherent sattva. Thus we find that the rajas side or “I as active” has become manifested or known as such, i.e. “I” becomes conscious of itself as active. And this is just what is meant by self-consciousness.

This ego or self-consciousness then appears as the modification of the contentless pure consciousness of the mind ( buddhi ); it is for this reason that we see that this self-consciousness is but a modification of the universal mind. The absolute identity of subject and object as the egohood is not a part of our natural consciousness, for in all stages of our actual consciousness, even in that of self-consciousness, there is an element of the preponderance of rajas or activity which directs this unity as the knower and the known and then unites them as it were. Only so far as I distinguish myself as the conscious, from myself as the object of consciousness, am I at all conscious of myself.

When we see that the buddhi transforms itself into the ego, the subject, or the knower, at this its first phase there is no other content which it can know, it therefore knows itself in a very abstract way as the “I,” or in other words, the ego becomes self-conscious; but at this moment the ego has no content; the tamas being quite under suppression, it is evolved by a preponderance of the rajas; and thus its nature as rajas is manifested by the sattva and thus the ego now essentially knows itself to be active, and holds itself as the permanent energising activity which connects with itself all the phenomena of our life.

But now when the ego first directs itself towards itself and becomes conscious of itself, one question which naturally comes to our mind is, “Can the ego direct itself towards itself and thus divide itself into a part that sees and one that is seen?” To meet this question it is assumed that the guṇas contain within themselves the germs of both subjectivity and objectivity ( guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam vyavaseyātmakatvaṃ ca. Tattvavaiśāradī, III. 47); the guṇas have two forms, the perceiver and the perceived. Thus we find that in the ego the quality of the guṇas as the perceiver comes to be first manifested and the ego turns back upon itself and makes itself its own object. It is at this stage that we are reminded of the twofold nature of the guṇas.

It is by virtue of this twofold nature that the subject can make itself its own object; but as these two sides have not yet developed they are still only abstract and exist but in an implicit way in this state of the ego ( ahaṃkāra ).

Enquiring further into the nature of the relation of this ego and the buddhi, we find that the ego is only another phase or modification of the buddhi; however different it might appear from buddhi it is only an appearance or phase of it; its reality is the reality of the buddhi. Thus we see that when the knower is affected in his different modes of concepts and judgments, this too is to be ascribed to the buddhi. Thus Vyāsa writes (II. 18) that perception, memory, differentiation, reasoning, right knowledge, decision belong properly to mind (buddhi) and are only illusorily imposed on the purusha ( grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ ).

Now from this ego we find that three developments take place in three distinct directions according to the preponderance of sattva, rajas or tamas.

By the preponderance of rajas, the ego develops itself into the five conative senses, vāk (speech), pāṇi (hands), pāda (feet), pāyu (organ of passing the excreta) and upastha (generative organ). By the preponderance of sattva, the ego develops itself into the five cognitive senses—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell; and by a preponderance of tamas it stands as the bhūtādi and produces the five tanmātras, and these again by further preponderance of tamas develops into the particles of the five gross elements of earth, water, light, heat, air and ether.

Now it is clear that when the self becomes conscious of itself as object we see that there are three phases in it: (i) that in which the self becomes an object to itself; (ii) when it directs itself or turns as the subject upon itself as the object, this moment of activity which can effect an aspect of change in itself; (iii) the aspect of the consciousness of the self, the moment in which it perceives itself in its object, the moment of the union of itself as the subject and itself as the object in one luminosity of self-consciousness. Now that phase of self in which it is merely an object to itself is the phase of its union with prakṛti which further develops the prakṛti in moments of materiality by a preponderance of the inert tamas of the bhūtādi into tanmātras and these again into the five grosser elements which are then called the grāhya or perceptible.

The sattva side of this ego or self-consciousness which was hitherto undifferentiated becomes further differentiated, specialised and modified into the five cognitive senses with their respective functions of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, synchronising with the evolution of the prakṛti on the tanmātric side of evolution. These again individually suffer infinite modifications themselves and thus cause an infinite variety of sensations in their respective spheres in our conscious life. The rajas side of the ego becomes specialised as the active faculties of the five different conative organs.

There is another specialisation of the ego as the manas which is its direct instrument for connecting itself with the five cognitive and conative senses. What is perceived as mere sensations by the senses is connected and generalised and formed into concepts by the manas; it is therefore spoken of as partaking of both the conative and the cognitive aspects in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 27.

Now though the modifications of the ego are formed successively by the preponderance of sattva, rajas and tamas, yet the rajas is always the accessory cause ( sahakāri ) of all these varied collocations of the guṇas; it is the supreme principle of energy and supplies even intelligence with the energy which it requires for its own conscious activity. Thus Lokācāryya says in his Tattvatraya : “the tāmasa ego developing into the material world and the sāttvika ego developing into the eleven senses, both require the help of the rājasa ego for the production of this development” ( anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkūraḥ sahakārī bhavati ); and Barabara in his Bhāshya writes: “just as a seed-sprout requires for its growth the help of water as instrumental cause, so the rājasa ahaṃkāra (ego) works as the accessory cause ( sahakāri ) for the transformations of sāttvika and tāmasa ahaṃkāra into their evolutionary products.” The mode of working of this instrumental cause is described as “rajas is the mover.” The rājasa ego thus moves the sattva part to generate the senses; the tamas part generating the gross and subtle matter is also moved by the rajas, agent of movement. The rājasa ego is thus called the common cause of the movement of the sāttvika and the tāmasa ego. Vācaspati also says: “though rajas has no separate work by itself yet since sattva and tamas (which though capable of undergoing modification, do not do their work) are actionless in themselves, the agency of rajas lies in this that it moves them both for the production of the effect.” [27] And according as the modifications are sāttvika, tāmasa or rājasika, the ego which is the cause of these different modifications is also called vaikārika, bhūtādi and taijasa. The mahat also as the source of the vaikārika, taijasa and bhūtādi ego may be said to have three aspects.

Now speaking of the relation of the sense faculties with the sense organs, we see that the latter, which are made up of the grosser elements are the vehicle of the former, for if the latter are injured in any way, the former are also necessarily affected. [28]

To take for example the specific case of the faculty of hearing and its organ, we see that the faculty of hearing is seated in the ether ( ākāśa ) within our ear-hole. It is here that the power of hearing is located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or defect is noticed in the power of hearing also. When the sounds of solids, etc., are heard, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear stands in need of the resonance produced in the ākāśa of the ear.

This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle of ahaṃkāra, behaves like iron, and is drawn by the sounds originated and located in the mouth of the speaker acting as loadstone, and transforms them into its own successive modifications ( vṛtti ) and thus senses the sounds of the speaker. And it is for this reason that for every living creature, the perception of sound in external space in the absence of defects is never void of authority. Thus Pancasikha also says, as quoted in Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 41:

“To all those whose organs of hearing are situated in the same place (at different times) the ākāśa sustaining the sense of hearing is the same.” The ākāśa, again, in which the power of hearing is seated, is born out of the soniferous tanmātra, and has therefore the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison that it takes the sounds of external solids, etc. This then proves that the ākāśa is the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses the quality of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication of the existence of ākāśa as that which is the substratum of the auditory power ( śruti ) which manifests the sounds of the same class in ākāśa. Such a manifestation of sound cannot be without such an auditory sense-power. Nor is such an auditory power a quality of pṛthivī (earth), etc., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifestor and the manifested ( vyaṅgya and vyañjaka ), Tattvavaiśāradī, III. 41. It is the auditory power which manifests all sounds with the help of the ākāśa of the sense organ.

The theory of the guṇas was accepted by many others outside the Sāṃkhya-Yoga circle and they also offered their opinions on the nature of the categories.

There are thus other views prevalent about the genesis of the senses, to which it may be worth our while to pay some attention as we pass by.

The sāttvika ego in generating the cognitive senses with limited powers for certain specified objects of sense only accounted for their developments from itself in accompaniment with the specific tanmātras. Thus

sāttvika ego + sound potential (śabda-tanmātra) = sense of hearing.

sāttvika ego + touch potential (śparś-tanmātra) = sense of touch.

sāttvika ego + sight potential (rūpa-tanmātra) = sense of vision.

58 sāttvika ego + taste potential (rasa-tanmātra) = sense of taste.

sāttvika ego + smell potential (gandha-tanmātra) = sense of smell.

The conative sense of speech is developed in association with the sense of hearing; that of hand in association with the sense of touch; that of feet in association with the sense of vision; that of upastha in association with the sense of taste; that of pāyu in association with the sense of smell.

Last of all, the manas is developed from the ego without any co-operating or accompanying cause.

The Naiyāyikas, however, think that the senses are generated by the gross elements, the ear for example by ākāśa, the touch by air and so forth. But Lokācāryya in his Tattvatraya holds that the senses are not generated by gross matter but are rather sustained and strengthened by it.

There are others who think that the ego is the instrumental and that the gross elements are the material causes in the production of the senses.

The view of the Vyāsa-bhāshya is, I believe, now quite clear since we see that the mahat through the asmitā generates from the latter (as differentiations from it, though it itself exists as integrated in the mahat), the senses, and their corresponding gross elements.

Before proceeding further to trace the development of the bhūtādi on the tanmātric side, I think it is best to refer to the views about the supposed difference between the Yoga and the views of the Sāṃkhya works about the evolution of the categories. Now according to the Yoga view two parallel lines of evolution start from mahat, one of which develops into the ego, manas, the five cognitive and the five conative senses, while on the other side it develops into the five grosser elements through the five tanmātras which are directly produced from mahat through the medium ahaṃkāra.

Thus the view as found in the Yoga works may be tabulated thus:—

The view of the Śaṃkhya works may be tabulated thus:--

The place in the Vyāsa-bhāshya which refers to this genesis is that under viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi, II. 19. There it says that the four bhūtas are ether, air, fire, water and earth. These are the viśeshas (specialised modifications) of the unspecialised modifications the tanmātras of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. So also are the cognitive senses of hearing, touch, eye, tongue, and nose and the conative senses of speech, hand, feet, anus and the generative organ. The eleventh one manas (the co-ordinating organ) has for its object the objects of all the above ten senses. So these are the specialised modifications ( viśeshas ) of the unspecialised (aviśesha) asmitā. The guṇas have these sixteen kinds of specialised modifications ( viśeshapariṇāma ). The six unspecialised modifications are the sound tanmātra, touch tanmātra, colour tanmātra, taste tanmātra and smell tanmātra. These tanmātras respectively contain one, two, three, four, and five special characteristics. The sixth unspecialised modification is asmitāmātra. These are the six aviśesha evolutions of the pure being, the mahat. The category of mahat is merely a sign beyond the aviśeshas and it is there that these exist and develop.

In this Vyāsa-bhāshya the fully specialised ones, viśeshas, the grosser elements are said to have been derived from the tanmātras and the senses and manas, the faculty of reflection are said to have been specialised from the ego or asmitā. The tanmātras, however, have not been derived from the ego or asmitā here. But they together with asmitā are spoken of as the six slightly specialised ones, the five being the five tanmātras and the sixth one being the ego. These six aviśeshas are the specialisations of the mahat, the great egohood of pure Be-ness. It therefore appears that the six aviśeshas are directly derived from the mahat, after which the ego develops into the eleven senses and the tanmātras into the five gross elements in three different lines.

But let us see how Yoga-vārttika explains the point here:—

“But like the senses the tanmātras are also special modifications of the ahaṃkāra having specially modified characteristics such as sound, touch, etc., why, therefore, are they not mentioned as special modifications ( viśeshas )? The answer is that those only are mentioned as special modification which are ultimate special modifications. The tanmātras are indeed the special modifications of the ego, but they themselves produce further special modifications, the bhūtas. The aviśeshas are explained as the six aviśeshas. The tanmātras are generated from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra gradually through sound, etc. The category of mahat which is the ground of all modifications, called also the buddhi, has six evolutionary products called the aviśeshas. Though the mahat and the prakṛti may also be regarded as the root-causes out of which the tanmātras have evolved, yet the word aviśesha is used as a technical term having a special application to the six aviśeshas only.” The modifications of these are from the buddhi through the intermediate stage of the ahaṃkāra, as has been explained in the Bhāshya, I. 45.

Thus we see that the Yoga-vārttika says that the Bhāshya is here describing the modifications of buddhi in two distinct classes, the aviśeshas and the viśeshas; and that the mahat has been spoken of as the source of all the aviśeshas, the five tanmātras and the ego; strictly speaking, however, the genesis of the tanmātras from mahat takes place through the ego and in association with the ego, for it has been so described in the Bhāshya, I. 45.

Nāgeśa in explaining this Bhāshya only repeats the view of Yoga-vārttika .

Now let us refer to the Bhāshya of I. 45, alluded to by the Yoga-vārttika : “The gradual series of subtler causes proceeds up to the aliṅga or the prakṛti. The earth atom has the smell tanmātra as its subtle cause; the water atom has the taste tanmātra; the air atom the touch tanmātra; the ākāśa atom the sound tanmātra; and of these ahaṃkāra is the subtle cause; and of this the mahat is the subtle cause.” Here by subtle cause ( sūkshma ) it is upādānakāraṇa or material cause which is meant; so the Bhāshya further says: “It is true that purusha is the subtlest of all. But yet as prakṛti is subtler than the mahat, it is not in that sense that purusha is subtler than prakṛti for purusha is only an instrumental cause of the evolution of mahat, but not its material cause.” I believe it is quite clear that ahaṃkāra is spoken of here as the sūkshma anvayikārana of the tanmātras. This anvayikāraṇa is the same as upādāna (material cause) as Vācaspati calls it. Now again in the Bhāshya of the same sūtra II. 19 later on we see the liṅga or the mahat is the stage next to prakṛti, it is differentiated from it though still remaining integrated in the regular order of evolution. The six aviśeshas are again differentiated while still remaining integrated in the mahat in the order of evolution ( pariṇāmakramaniyama ).

The mahat tattva (liṅga) is associated with the prakṛti (aliṅga). Its development is thus to be considered as the production of a differentiation as integrated within the prakṛti. The six aviśeshas are also to be considered as the production of successive differentiations as integrated within the mahat.

The words saṃsṛshṭa vivicyante are the most important here for they show us the real nature of the transformations. “ Saṃsṛshtā ” means integrated and “ vivicyante ” means differentiated. This shows that the order of evolution as found in the Sāṃkhya works (viz. mahat from prakṛti, ahaṃkāra from mahat and the eleven senses and the tanmātras from ahaṃkāra) is true only in this sense that these modifications of ahaṃkāra take place directly as differentiations of characters in the body of mahat. As these differentiations take place through ahaṃkāra as the first moment in the series of transformations it is said that the transformations take place directly from ahaṃkāra; whereas when stress is laid on the other aspect it appears that the transformations are but differentiations as integrated in the body of the mahat, and thus it is also said that from mahat the six aviśeshas—namely, ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras—come out. This conception of evolution as differentiation within integration bridges the gulf between the views of Yoga and the Saṃkhya works. We know that the tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra. This ahaṃkāra is nothing but the tāmasa side of mahat roused into creative activity by rajas. 63 The sāttvika ahaṃkāra is given as a separate category producing the senses, whereas the tamas as bhūtādi produces the tanmātras from its disturbance while held up within the mahat. [29]

Nāgeśa in the Chāyā-vyākhyā of II. 19, however, follows the Sāṃkhya explanation. He says: “The five tanmātras having in order one, two, three, four and five characteristics are such that the preceding ones are the causes of the succeeding ones. The śabdatanmātra has only the characteristic of sound, the sparśatanmātra of sound and touch and so on.... All these tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra in the order of śabda, sparśa, etc.” This ignores the interpretation of the Vyāsā-bhāshya that the tanmātras are differentiations within the integrated whole of mahat through the intermediary stage of the tāmasa ahaṃkāra.