Discourses of Epictetus

Discourses of Epictetus · Epictetus

Book I, Chapter XXV: On the Same Theme

Translated by P.E. Matheson (1916) · 26 of 102

CHAPTER XXV ON THE SAME THEME If this is true, and if we are not silly and insincere when we say that for men good and evil lies in the region of the will, and that everything else has no concern for us, why are we disturbed or fearful any more? No one has authority over the things in which we are interested: and we pay no regard to the things over which others have authority. What more have we to trouble about?

'Nay, but give me commands' (says the student).

What command should I give you? Has not Zeus laid commands upon you? Has He not given you what is yours, free from hindrance and constraint, and what is not yours subject to hindrance and constraint? What command then have you brought with you into the world, and what manner of ordinance? Guard what is your own by all means, grasp not at the things of others. Your good faith is your own.... Who can take these qualities from you? Who shall hinder you from using them but yourself? And how will you do so? When you take no interest in what is your own, you lose it and it ceases to be yours.

When you have instructions and commands from Zeus such as these, what commands would you have from me? Am I greater or more trustworthy than He? Do you need any other commands if you keep these of His? Has He not laid these commands upon you? Look at the primary conceptions. Look at the demonstrations of philosophers. Look at the lessons you have often heard, and the words you have spoken yourself—all you have read, all you have studied.

How long, then, is it right to keep these commands and not break up the game?

As long as it is conducted properly.

Here is a king chosen by lot at the Saturnalia: for they decide to play the game of 'Kings'. He gives his orders: 'You drink, you mix the wine, you sing, you go, you come'. I obey, that I may not break up the game.

'Now believe that you are in evil case.'

I do not believe it, and who will compel me to believe it?

Again, we agree to play 'Agamemnon and Achilles'. He who is given the part of Agamemnon says to me, 'Go to Achilles and drag away Briseis'. I go. 'Come.' I come.

In fact we must behave in life as we do with hypothetical arguments. 'Let us assume it is night.'

Granted.

'What follows? Is it day?'

No, for I have already assented to the assumption that it is night.

'Let us assume that you believe that it is night.'

Granted.

'Now believe that it really is night.'

This does not follow from the hypothesis.

So too it is in life. 'Let us assume that you are unfortunate.'

Granted.

'Are you then unfortunate?'

Yes.

'What then, are you in misery?'

Yes.

'Now, believe that you are in evil case.'

This does not follow from the hypothesis: and Another forbids me.

How far, then, must we submit to such commands? So far as is expedient; that is, so far as I am true to what is becoming and consistent. There are, however, some severe and sour-tempered persons who say, 'I cannot dine with this fellow, and put up with his daily narrative of how he fought in Mysia. "I told you, brother, how I mounted the hill: now I begin again at the siege."' Another says, 'I would rather dine and hear him babble on to his heart's content.' It is for you to compare these estimates: only do nothing in the spirit of one burdened and afflicted, who believes himself in evil case: for no one compels you to this. Suppose some one made the room smoke. If the smoke is moderate I will stay: if excessive, I go out: for one must remember and hold fast to this, that the door is open.

The order comes, 'Do not dwell in Nicopolis.'

I will not.

'Nor in Athens.'

I give up Athens.

'Nor in Rome.'

I give up Rome.

'Dwell in Gyara.'

I dwell in Gyara: but this seems to me a very smoky room indeed, and I depart where no one shall hinder me from dwelling: for that dwelling is open to every man. And beyond the last inner tunic, which is this poor body of mine, no one has any authority over me at all. That is why Demetrius said to Nero, 'You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you.' If I pay regard to my poor body, I have given myself over as a slave: and if I value my wretched property I am a slave, for thereby I show at once what power can master me. Just as when the snake draws in its head I say, 'Strike the part of him which he guards,' so you may be sure that your master will trample on that part of you which you wish to guard. When you remember this, whom will you flatter or fear any more?

'Nay, but I want to sit where the senators sit.'

Do you see that you are making a strait place for yourself and squeezing yourself?

'How else then shall I have a good view in the amphitheatre?'

Man, do not go to the show and you will not be crushed. Why do you trouble yourself? Or wait a little, and when the show is done, sit down in the senators' seats and sun yourself. For remember this (and it is true universally) that it is we who straiten and crush ourselves—that is to say, it is our judgements which straiten and crush us. For instance, what does it mean to be slandered? Stand by a stone and slander it: what effect will you produce? If a man then listens like a stone, what advantage has the slanderer? But if the slanderer has the weakness of him that he slanders to work upon, then he does achieve something.

'Tear his toga off him.'

Why bring him in? Take his toga. Tear that.

'I have done you an outrage.'

May it turn out to your good.

These were the principles that. Socrates practised: that is why his face always wore the same expression. But we are fain to study and practise everything except how to be free men and untrammelled.

'The philosophers talk paradoxes.'

But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? Nay, what is more paradoxical than to lance a man's eye that he may see? If one told this to a person unskilled in the physician's art, would he not laugh at him who said it? Is it surprising then that in philosophy also many truths seem paradoxical to those who are unskilled?

Up next

Book I, Chapter XXVI: What Is the Law of Life

CHAPTER XXVI WHAT IS THE LAW OF LIFE When some one was reciting hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said: This also is a law which governs hypothesis, that we must accept what conforms with the hypothesis.

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Contents

Discourses of Epictetus · Epictetus

102 chapters

  1. 01ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS2 min
  2. 02Book I, Chapter I: On Things in Our Power and Things Not in Our Power6 min
  3. 03Book I, Chapter II: How One May Be True to One's Character in Everything6 min
  4. 04Book I, Chapter III: What Conclusions May Be Drawn from the Fact That God Is Father of Men2 min
  5. 05Book I, Chapter IV: On Progress, or Moral Advance6 min
  6. 06Book I, Chapter V: Against Followers of the Academy2 min
  7. 07Book I, Chapter VI: On Providence7 min
  8. 08Book I, Chapter VII: On the Use of Variable Premisses and Hypothetical Arguments and the Like5 min
  9. 09Book I, Chapter VIII: That Faculties Are Fraught with Danger for the Uneducated3 min
  10. 10Book I, Chapter IX: How One May Draw Conclusions from the Fact That We Are God's Kinsmen6 min
  11. 11Book I, Chapter X: To Those Who Have Spent Their Energies on Advancement in Rome3 min
  12. 12Book I, Chapter XI: On Family Affection7 min
  13. 13Book I, Chapter XII: On Contentment6 min
  14. 14Book I, Chapter XIII: How One May Act in All Things So as to Please the Gods2 min
  15. 15Book I, Chapter XIV: That God Beholds All Men3 min
  16. 16Book I, Chapter XV: What Philosophy Professes2 min
  17. 17Book I, Chapter XVI: On Providence4 min
  18. 18Book I, Chapter XVII: That the Processes of Logic Are Necessary5 min
  19. 19Book I, Chapter XVIII: That We Should Not Be Angry at Men's Errors5 min
  20. 20Book I, Chapter XIX: How One Should Behave Towards Tyrants5 min
  21. 21Book I, Chapter XX: How Reason Has the Faculty of Taking Cognizance of Itself3 min
  22. 22Book I, Chapter XXI: To Those Who Wish to Be Admired1 min
  23. 23Book I, Chapter XXII: On Primary Conceptions4 min
  24. 24Book I, Chapter XXIII: Against Epicurus2 min
  25. 25Book I, Chapter XXIV: How One Should Contend Against Difficulties4 min
  26. 26Book I, Chapter XXV: On the Same Theme5 min left
  27. 27Book I, Chapter XXVI: What Is the Law of Life4 min
  28. 28Book I, Chapter XXVII: On the Ways in Which Impressions Come to Us: and the Aids We Must Provide for Ourselves to Deal with Them4 min
  29. 29Book I, Chapter XXVIII: That We Must Not Be Angry with Men: and Concerning What Things Are Small and What Are Great Among Men6 min
  30. 30Book I, Chapter XXIX: On Constancy12 min
  31. 31Book I, Chapter XXX: What a Man Should Have Ready to Hand in the Crises of Life2 min
  32. 32Notes to Book I2 min
  33. 33Book II, Chapter I: That There Is No Conflict Between Confidence and Caution8 min
  34. 34Book II, Chapter II: On Peace of Mind5 min
  35. 35Book II, Chapter III: To Those Who Commend Persons to Philosophers2 min
  36. 36Book II, Chapter IV: To the Man Caught in Adultery3 min
  37. 37Book II, Chapter V: How a Careful Life Is Compatible with a Noble Spirit6 min
  38. 38Book II, Chapter VI: On What Is Meant by 'indifferent' Things5 min
  39. 39Book II, Chapter VII: How to Consult Diviners3 min
  40. 40Book II, Chapter VIII: What Is the True Nature of the Good6 min
  41. 41Book II, Chapter IX: That We Adopt the Profession of the Philosopher When We Cannot Fulfil That of a Man4 min
  42. 42Book II, Chapter X: How the Acts Appropriate to Man Are to Be Discovered from the Names He Bears5 min
  43. 43Book II, Chapter XI: What Is the Beginning of Philosophy4 min
  44. 44Book II, Chapter XII: On the Art of Discussion5 min
  45. 45Book II, Chapter XIII: Concerning Anxiety6 min
  46. 46Book II, Chapter XIV: On Naso6 min
  47. 47Book II, Chapter XV: On Those Who Cling Stubbornly to Their Judgements4 min
  48. 48Book II, Chapter XVI: That We Do Not Practise Applying Our Judgements About Things Good and Evil9 min
  49. 49Book II, Chapter XVII: How We Must Adjust Our Primary Conceptions to Particular Things8 min
  50. 50Book II, Chapter XVIII: How We Must Struggle Against Impressions5 min
  51. 51Book II, Chapter XIX: To Those Who Take Up the Principles of the Philosophers Only to Discuss Them7 min
  52. 52Book II, Chapter XX: Against Followers of Epicurus and of the Academy8 min
  53. 53Book II, Chapter XXI: Concerning Inconsistency of Mind5 min
  54. 54Book II, Chapter XXII: On Friendship8 min
  55. 55Book II, Chapter XXIII: On the Faculty of Expression10 min
  56. 56Book II, Chapter XXIV: To One Whom He Did Not Think Worthy6 min
  57. 57Book II, Chapter XXV: How the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary1 min
  58. 58Book II, Chapter XXVI: What Is the Distinctive Character of Error2 min
  59. 59Notes to Book II1 min
  60. 60Book III, Chapter I: On Adornment10 min