Discourses of Epictetus

Discourses of Epictetus · Epictetus

Book III, Chapter I: On Adornment

Translated by P.E. Matheson (1916) · 60 of 102

BOOK III CHAPTER I ON ADORNMENT When a young student of rhetoric came into his lecture-room with his hair elaborately arranged and paying great attention to his dress in general: Tell me, said he, do you not think that some dogs and horses are beautiful and some ugly, and is it not so with every creature?

'I think so', he said.

Is not the same true of men, some are beautiful, some ugly?

'Certainly.'

Now do we give the attribute 'beautiful' to each of them in their own kind on the same grounds or on special grounds in each case? Listen and you will see what I mean. Since we see that a dog is born for one thing and a horse for another, and a nightingale, if you like to take that, for another, speaking generally one would not be giving an absurd opinion in saying that each of them was beautiful when it best fulfilled its nature; and since the nature of each is different, I think that each of them would be beautiful in a different way, would it not?

'Yes.'

So that what makes a dog beautiful makes a horse ugly, and what makes a horse beautiful makes a dog ugly, seeing that their natures are different?

'So it seems.'

Yes, for what makes a pancratiast 3-1 beautiful does not, I imagine, make a good wrestler, and makes a very ridiculous runner; and one who is beautiful for the pentathlon makes a very ugly appearance as a wrestler?

'True', he said.

What then makes a man beautiful if it is not that which in its kind makes dog and horse beautiful?

'It is just that', he said.

What then makes a dog beautiful? The presence of a dog's virtue. What makes a horse beautiful? The presence of a horse's virtue. What makes a man beautiful? Is it the presence of a man's virtue? Therefore, young man, if you would be beautiful, make this the object of your effort, human virtue. And what is human virtue? Consider whom you praise, when you praise men dispassionately; do you praise the just or the unjust?

'The just.'

Do you praise the temperate or the intemperate?

'The temperate.'

The continent or the incontinent?

'The continent.'

Therefore if you make yourself such an one, be sure that you will make yourself beautiful, but as long as you neglect this you cannot help being ugly, though you should use every device to appear beautiful.

But beyond this I do not know what more to say to you; for, if I say what I think, I shall vex you and you will go out and perhaps never return, but if I say nothing, consider what my conduct will be then; you come to me to get good, and I shall be refusing to do you good; you come to me to consult a philosopher, and I shall be refusing you a philosopher's advice. Besides, it is cruelty towards you to leave you uncorrected. If some day hereafter you come to your senses you will accuse me with god reason: 'What did Epictetus find in me, that when he saw me coming in to him in such a shameful state he should do nothing for me a say never a word to me? Did he so utterly despair of me? Was I n young? Was I not fit to listen to discourse? How many other young men make many mistakes like me in their youth? I hear that one Polemo, who had been the most intemperate of young men, underwent such a wonderful change. Grant that he did not think I should be a Polemo: he could have set my hair right, have taken away my bangles, have stopped me pulling my hairs out, but seeing that I had the aspect of—whom shall I say?—he said nothing.' I do not say whose aspect this is, but you will say it for yourself when you come to look into your own heart, and you will learn what it means and what sort of men they are who adopt it.

If hereafter you bring this charge against me, what defence shall I be able to make?

Yes, but suppose I do speak, and he will not obey?

Did Laius obey Apollo? Did he not go away in his drunken stupor and dismiss the oracle from his mind? What then? Did Apollo withhold the truth from him for that reason? Indeed I do not know whether you will obey me or not, but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not obey, and yet he spoke. Why did he speak? Nay, why is he Apollo, why does he give oracles, why has he set himself in this position, to be a Prophet and a Fountain of truth, so that men from all the world come to him? Why is 'Know thyself' written up over his shrine, though no one understands it?

Did Socrates persuade all who came to him to attend to their characters Not one in a thousand! Nevertheless when appointed to this post, as he says, by the ordinance of God, he refused to desert it. Nay, what did he say to his judges? 'If you acquit me', he says, 'on these terms, that I cease to do what I do now, I shall not accept your offer, nor give up my ways, but I shall go to any one I meet, young or old, and put to him these questions that I put now, and I shall question you my fellow citizens far more than any others because you are nearer akin to me.' [Plato, Apology, 29c]

Are you so fussy and interfering, Socrates? What do you care what we do?

'What language to use! You are my fellow and kinsman, yet you neglect yourself and provide the city with a bad citizen, your kinsmen with a bad kinsman, and your neighbours with a bad neighbour!'

'Who are you, then?'

To this question it is a weighty answer to say, 'I am he who is bound to take interest in men.' For ordinary cattle dare not resist the lion; but if the bull comes up to withstand him, say to hire, if you think fit, 'Who are you?' and 'What do you care?' Man! in every class of creatures nature produces some exceptional specimen; it is so among cattle, dogs, bees, horses. Do not say then to the exception, 'What are you then?' If you do, he will get a voice somehow and say, 'I am like the purple in a garment: do not require me to be like the rest, nor blame my nature, because it made me different from the rest.'

What then? Am I fit to play this part? How can I be? And are you fit to hear the truth? Would that it were so! Nevertheless since I am condemned, it seems, to wear a white beard and a cloak, and since you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly as though I despaired of you, but will say, Young man, who is it that you want to make beautiful? First get to know who you are, and then adorn yourself. You are a man, that is, a mortal creature which has the power to deal with impressions rationally. What does 'rationally' mean? Perfectly, and in accordance with nature. What then is your distinctive possession? Your animal nature? No. Your mortality? No. Your power to deal with impressions? No. Your reasoning faculty is the distinctive one: this you must adorn and make beautiful. Leave your hair to Him that formed it in accordance with His will. Tell me, what other names have you? Are you man or woman?

'Man.'

Adorn Man then, not Woman. Woman is born smooth and tender, and if she has much hair on her body it is a prodigy, and exhibited in Rome as a prodigy. But in a man it is a prodigy not to be hairy: if he is born smooth it is a prodigy, and if he make himself smooth by shaving and plucking, what are we to make of him? Where are we to show him, and what notice are we to put up? 'I will show you a man who prefers to be a woman.' What a shocking exhibition! Every one will be astonished at the notice: by Zeus, I think that even the men who pluck out their hairs do so without understanding that this is what they are doing! Man, what complaint have you to make of Nature? Is it that she made you a man? Ought she to have made all to be women? Why, if all were women, there would be no one to adorn yourself for.

If you are not satisfied with your condition as it is, do the thing completely. Remove—what shall I call it?—that which is the cause of your hairiness; make yourself a woman out and out, and not half-man, half-woman, and then we shall not be misled. Whom do you wish to please? Your darling womenkind? Then please them as a man.

'Yes, but they like smooth men.'

Go and hang yourself! If they liked unnatural creatures, would you become one? Is this your function, is this what you were born for, that profligate women should take pleasure in you? Is it with this character that we are to make you a citizen of Corinth, and, if it so chance, City-warden, or Governor of the Ephebi, 3-2 or General, or Steward of the games? Well, and when you have married a wife, are you going to pluck yourself smooth? For whom and for what? And when you have begotten boys, are you going to bring them into our citizenship as plucked creatures too? Noble citizen and senator and orator! Is this the kind of young man we are to pray to have bred and reared for us?

Nay, by the gods, young man! but when once you have heard these words, go and say to yourself: 'These are not the words of Epictetus: how could they be? but some kind god speaks through him; for it would never have occurred to Epictetus to say this, as he is not wont to speak to any one. Come then, let us obey God, that we may not incur God's wrath.'

Why, if a raven croaks and gives you a sign, it is not the raven that gives the sign, but God through him: and if He gives you a sign through a human voice, will He not be making man tell you this, that you may learn the power of the divine, and see that it gives signs to some in this way, and to others in that, and of the highest and most sovereign matters gives signs through the noblest messenger? What else is the meaning of the poet, when he says

Since we warned him By Hermes Argus-slayer, clear of sight, To slay him not nor woo his wedded wife? [Homer, Odyssey, I. 39]

And as Hermes was sent down to tell him this, so now the gods have sent 'Hermes the Argus-slayer, their messenger,' and tell you this—not to pervert what is good and right, and not to interfere with it, but to leave man man and woman woman, the beautiful person a beautiful person, and the ugly person an ugly person. For you are not flesh, nor hair, but a rational will: if you get this beautiful, then you will be beautiful.

So far I do not dare to tell you that you are ugly, for I think you would hear anything rather than that. But see what Socrates says to Alcibiades, most beautiful and charming of men: 'Strive then to attain beauty.' What does he say to him? Does he say, 'Arrange your hair and smooth your legs'? God forbid! but 'Set your will in order, rid it of bad judgements.'

'How treat the poor body then?'

According to its nature: that is God's concern, trust it to Him. 'What then? Is the body to be unclean?'

God forbid! but cleanse your true, natural self: let man be clean as man, woman as woman, child as child.

Nay, let us pluck out the lion's mane, lest it be unclean, and the cock's comb, for he too must be clean!

Clean? yes, but clean as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hound of the chase as such a hound should be.

Up next

Book III, Chapter II: (1) In What Matters Should the Man Who Is to Make Progress Train Himself: and (2) That We Neglect What Is Most Vital

CHAPTER II 1) IN WHAT MATTERS SHOULD THE MAN WHO IS TO MAKE PROGRESS TRAIN HIMSELF: AND (2) THAT WE NEGLECT WHAT IS MOST VITAL There are three departments 3-3 in which a man who is to be good and noble must be trained.

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Contents

Discourses of Epictetus · Epictetus

102 chapters

  1. 01ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS2 min
  2. 02Book I, Chapter I: On Things in Our Power and Things Not in Our Power6 min
  3. 03Book I, Chapter II: How One May Be True to One's Character in Everything6 min
  4. 04Book I, Chapter III: What Conclusions May Be Drawn from the Fact That God Is Father of Men2 min
  5. 05Book I, Chapter IV: On Progress, or Moral Advance6 min
  6. 06Book I, Chapter V: Against Followers of the Academy2 min
  7. 07Book I, Chapter VI: On Providence7 min
  8. 08Book I, Chapter VII: On the Use of Variable Premisses and Hypothetical Arguments and the Like5 min
  9. 09Book I, Chapter VIII: That Faculties Are Fraught with Danger for the Uneducated3 min
  10. 10Book I, Chapter IX: How One May Draw Conclusions from the Fact That We Are God's Kinsmen6 min
  11. 11Book I, Chapter X: To Those Who Have Spent Their Energies on Advancement in Rome3 min
  12. 12Book I, Chapter XI: On Family Affection7 min
  13. 13Book I, Chapter XII: On Contentment6 min
  14. 14Book I, Chapter XIII: How One May Act in All Things So as to Please the Gods2 min
  15. 15Book I, Chapter XIV: That God Beholds All Men3 min
  16. 16Book I, Chapter XV: What Philosophy Professes2 min
  17. 17Book I, Chapter XVI: On Providence4 min
  18. 18Book I, Chapter XVII: That the Processes of Logic Are Necessary5 min
  19. 19Book I, Chapter XVIII: That We Should Not Be Angry at Men's Errors5 min
  20. 20Book I, Chapter XIX: How One Should Behave Towards Tyrants5 min
  21. 21Book I, Chapter XX: How Reason Has the Faculty of Taking Cognizance of Itself3 min
  22. 22Book I, Chapter XXI: To Those Who Wish to Be Admired1 min
  23. 23Book I, Chapter XXII: On Primary Conceptions4 min
  24. 24Book I, Chapter XXIII: Against Epicurus2 min
  25. 25Book I, Chapter XXIV: How One Should Contend Against Difficulties4 min
  26. 26Book I, Chapter XXV: On the Same Theme5 min
  27. 27Book I, Chapter XXVI: What Is the Law of Life4 min
  28. 28Book I, Chapter XXVII: On the Ways in Which Impressions Come to Us: and the Aids We Must Provide for Ourselves to Deal with Them4 min
  29. 29Book I, Chapter XXVIII: That We Must Not Be Angry with Men: and Concerning What Things Are Small and What Are Great Among Men6 min
  30. 30Book I, Chapter XXIX: On Constancy12 min
  31. 31Book I, Chapter XXX: What a Man Should Have Ready to Hand in the Crises of Life2 min
  32. 32Notes to Book I2 min
  33. 33Book II, Chapter I: That There Is No Conflict Between Confidence and Caution8 min
  34. 34Book II, Chapter II: On Peace of Mind5 min
  35. 35Book II, Chapter III: To Those Who Commend Persons to Philosophers2 min
  36. 36Book II, Chapter IV: To the Man Caught in Adultery3 min
  37. 37Book II, Chapter V: How a Careful Life Is Compatible with a Noble Spirit6 min
  38. 38Book II, Chapter VI: On What Is Meant by 'indifferent' Things5 min
  39. 39Book II, Chapter VII: How to Consult Diviners3 min
  40. 40Book II, Chapter VIII: What Is the True Nature of the Good6 min
  41. 41Book II, Chapter IX: That We Adopt the Profession of the Philosopher When We Cannot Fulfil That of a Man4 min
  42. 42Book II, Chapter X: How the Acts Appropriate to Man Are to Be Discovered from the Names He Bears5 min
  43. 43Book II, Chapter XI: What Is the Beginning of Philosophy4 min
  44. 44Book II, Chapter XII: On the Art of Discussion5 min
  45. 45Book II, Chapter XIII: Concerning Anxiety6 min
  46. 46Book II, Chapter XIV: On Naso6 min
  47. 47Book II, Chapter XV: On Those Who Cling Stubbornly to Their Judgements4 min
  48. 48Book II, Chapter XVI: That We Do Not Practise Applying Our Judgements About Things Good and Evil9 min
  49. 49Book II, Chapter XVII: How We Must Adjust Our Primary Conceptions to Particular Things8 min
  50. 50Book II, Chapter XVIII: How We Must Struggle Against Impressions5 min
  51. 51Book II, Chapter XIX: To Those Who Take Up the Principles of the Philosophers Only to Discuss Them7 min
  52. 52Book II, Chapter XX: Against Followers of Epicurus and of the Academy8 min
  53. 53Book II, Chapter XXI: Concerning Inconsistency of Mind5 min
  54. 54Book II, Chapter XXII: On Friendship8 min
  55. 55Book II, Chapter XXIII: On the Faculty of Expression10 min
  56. 56Book II, Chapter XXIV: To One Whom He Did Not Think Worthy6 min
  57. 57Book II, Chapter XXV: How the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary1 min
  58. 58Book II, Chapter XXVI: What Is the Distinctive Character of Error2 min
  59. 59Notes to Book II1 min
  60. 60Book III, Chapter I: On Adornment10 min left