Guide for the Perplexed

Guide for the Perplexed · Moses Maimonides

Part 1: Chapter LII

Translated by M. Friedlander (1904) · 61 of 194

CHAPTER LII EVERY description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which includes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be made in one of the following five ways:--

First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is described as a being that lives and has reason; such a description, containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have already shown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this kind of description cannot be given of God: for there are no previous causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that account it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers, who are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of God.

Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when, e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This kind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two ideas]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that every being which has the characteristics of man must also have reason. All agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should consider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this kind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the preceding kind.

Thirdly. An object is described by something different from its true essence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence of the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality, since it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is surprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can reject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when they say "He cannot be qualified," they can only mean that He possesses no quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object either constitutes its essence,--and in that case it is identical with the essence,--or it contains a quality of the object.

There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of the dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g., we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say. a carpenter, or a sage, or a physician: by all these we represent certain physical dispositions: nor does it make any difference whether we say "sin-fearing" or "merciful." Every trade, every profession, and every settled habit of man are certain physical dispositions.

All this is clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic. (b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no difference whether we say "soft or hard," or "strong or weak"; in both cases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g.

of a thing which is long, short, curved, straight, etc.

Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar qualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense, can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence, or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for they imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as regards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He is absolutely One.

Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g., to time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the father of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or who lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the father of Becr, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a certain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not the essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as qualities.

At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in reference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are convinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly there is no relation between Him and space.

But what we have to investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could be described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His creatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects correlative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation. Now, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only possible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any correlation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of relation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but wrongly.

It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to both; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion, only by way of pure homonymity. Consequently there is no relation whatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a relation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when two things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is no relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared with that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both belong to the same class--colour; when they belong to two different classes, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not even to a man of ordinary Intellect, although the two things belong to the same category: e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation between God and His creatures, considering the important difference between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they contained only relations: these, however, are the most appropriate of all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when those things change to which God is in relation.

Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by "its actions" the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in "carpenter," "painter," or "smith"--for these belong to the class of qualities which have been mentioned above-but I mean the action the latter has performed--we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these different actions do not imply that different elements must be contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded to His essence, as we have shown.

What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to His essence: and that the many attributes of different significations applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the next chapter.

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Part 1: Chapter LIII

CHAPTER LIII THE circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence of divine attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe in the corporeality of God.

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Contents

Guide for the Perplexed · Moses Maimonides

194 chapters

  1. 01Preface1 min
  2. 02Preface to Volume One of the First Edition1 min
  3. 03The Life of Moses Maimonides29 min
  4. 04The Moreh Nebuchim Literature30 min
  5. 05Analysis of the Guide for the Perplexed60 min
  6. 06Introduction2 min
  7. 07Prefatory Remarks19 min
  8. 08Directions for the Study of this Work4 min
  9. 09Introductory Remarks on Method6 min
  10. 10Part 1: Chapter I5 min
  11. 11Part 1: Chapter II6 min
  12. 12Part 1: Chapter III2 min
  13. 13Part 1: Chapter IV3 min
  14. 14Part 1: Chapter V4 min
  15. 15Part 1: Chapter VI1 min
  16. 16Part 1: Chapter VII3 min
  17. 17Part 1: Chapter VIII2 min
  18. 18Part 1: Chapter IX2 min
  19. 19Part 1: Chapter X4 min
  20. 20Part 1: Chapter XI3 min
  21. 21Part 1: Chapter XII2 min
  22. 22Part 1: Chapter XIII2 min
  23. 23Part 1: Chapter XIV1 min
  24. 24Part 1: Chapter XV2 min
  25. 25Part 1: Chapter XVI2 min
  26. 26Part 1: Chapter XVII2 min
  27. 27Part 1: Chapter XVIII4 min
  28. 28Part 1: Chapter XIX2 min
  29. 29Part 1: Chapter XX2 min
  30. 30Part 1: Chapter XXI6 min
  31. 31Part 1: Chapter XXII2 min
  32. 32Part 1: Chapter XXIII3 min
  33. 33Part 1: Chapter XXIV2 min
  34. 34Part 1: Chapter XXV2 min
  35. 35Part 1: Chapter XXVI3 min
  36. 36Part 1: Chapter XXVII4 min
  37. 37Part 1: Chapter XXVIII5 min
  38. 38Part 1: Chapter XXIX2 min
  39. 39Part 1: Chapter XXX3 min
  40. 40Part 1: Chapter XXXI4 min
  41. 41Part 1: Chapter XXXII5 min
  42. 42Part 1: Chapter XXXIII3 min
  43. 43Part 1: Chapter XXXIV12 min
  44. 44Part 1: Chapter XXXV4 min
  45. 45Part 1: Chapter XXXVI6 min
  46. 46Part 1: Chapter XXXVII4 min
  47. 47Part 1: Chapter XXXVIII1 min
  48. 48Part 1: Chapter XXXIX3 min
  49. 49Part 1: Chapter XL2 min
  50. 50Part 1: Chapter XLI3 min
  51. 51Part 1: Chapter XLII2 min
  52. 52Part 1: Chapter XLIII2 min
  53. 53Part 1: Chapter XLIV1 min
  54. 54Part 1: Chapter XLV2 min
  55. 55Part 1: Chapter XLVI12 min
  56. 56Part 1: Chapter XLVII3 min
  57. 57Part 1: Chapter XLVIII4 min
  58. 58Part 1: Chapter XLIX5 min
  59. 59Part 1: Chapter L3 min
  60. 60Part 1: Chapter LI4 min