Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras

Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras · Iamblichus

Fragments: From Theages, on the Virtues

Translated by Thomas Taylor (1818) · 41 of 54

The order of the soul subsists in such a way, that one part of it is the reasoning power, another is anger, and another is desire. And the reasoning power, indeed, has dominion over knowledge; anger over impetus; and desire intrepidly rules over the appetitions of the soul. When therefore these three parts pass into one, and exhibit one appropriate composition, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul. But when they are divulsed from each other by sedition, then vice and discord are produced in the soul. It is necessary, however, that virtue should have these three things, viz. reason, power, and deliberate choice. The virtue, therefore, of the reasoning power of the soul is prudence; for it is a habit of judging and contemplating. But the virtue of the irascible part, is fortitude; for it is a habit of resisting, and enduring things of a dreadful nature. And the virtue of the epithymetic or appetitive part is temperance; for it is a moderation and detention of the pleasures which arise through the body. But the virtue of the whole soul is justice. For men indeed become bad, either through vice, or through incontinence, or through a natural ferocity. But they injure each other, either through gain, or through pleasure, or through ambition. Vice, therefore, more appropriately belongs to the reasoning part of the soul. For prudence indeed is similar to art; but vice to pernicious art. For it invents contrivances for the purpose of acting unjustly. But incontinence rather pertains to the appetitive part of the soul. For continence consists in subduing, and incontinence in not subduing pleasures. And ferocity pertains to the irascible part of the soul. For when some one, through acting ill from desire, is gratified not as a man should be, but as a wild beast, then a thing of this kind is denominated ferocity. The effects also of these dispositions are consequent to the things for the sake of which they are performed. For avarice is consequent to vice; but vice is consequent to the reasoning part of the soul. And ambition, indeed, follows from the irascible part; and this becoming excessive, generates ferocity. Again, pleasure pertains to the appetitive part; but this being sought after more vehemently, generates incontinence. Hence, since the acting unjustly is produced from so many causes, it is evident that acting justly is effected through an equal number of causes. For virtue, indeed, is naturally beneficent and profitable; but vice is productive of evil, and is noxious.

Since, however, of the parts of the soul, one is the leader, but the other follows, and the virtues and the vices subsist about these, and in these; it is evident that with respect to the virtues also, some are leaders, others are followers, and others, are composed from these. And the leaders, indeed, are such as prudence; but the followers are such as fortitude and temperance; and the composites from these, are such as justice. The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for the virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the passions, one is voluntary, but another is involuntary. And the voluntary, indeed, is pleasure; but the involuntary is pain. Men also, who have the political virtues, give intension and remission to these, co-harmonizing the other parts of the soul, to that part which possesses reason. But the boundary of this co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive, subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male. For the latter sows, generating a soul; but the former alone imparts matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational subsists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants. But intellect being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent, investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and more honorable than itself. For the knowledge of things divine and most honorable, is the principle, cause, and rule of human blessedness.

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The virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man.

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Contents

Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras · Iamblichus

54 chapters

  1. 01Chapter I2 min
  2. 02Chapter II6 min
  3. 03Chapter III4 min
  4. 04Chapter IV1 min
  5. 05Chapter V6 min
  6. 06Chapter VI3 min
  7. 07Chapter VII2 min
  8. 08Chapter VIII6 min
  9. 09Chapter IX5 min
  10. 10Chapter X2 min
  11. 11Chapter XI3 min
  12. 12Chapter XII2 min
  13. 13Chapter XIII2 min
  14. 14Chapter XIV2 min
  15. 15Chapter XV4 min
  16. 16Chapter XVI3 min
  17. 17Chapter XVII7 min
  18. 18Chapter XVIII9 min
  19. 19Chapter XIX4 min
  20. 20Chapter XX3 min
  21. 21Chapter XXI3 min
  22. 22Chapter XXII2 min
  23. 23Chapter XXIII3 min
  24. 24Chapter XXIV3 min
  25. 25Chapter XXV3 min
  26. 26Chapter XXVI6 min
  27. 27Chapter XXVII9 min
  28. 28Chapter XXVIII17 min
  29. 29Chapter XXIX8 min
  30. 30Chapter XXX14 min
  31. 31Chapter XXXI17 min
  32. 32Chapter XXXII10 min
  33. 33Chapter XXXIII9 min
  34. 34Chapter XXXIV5 min
  35. 35Chapter XXXV12 min
  36. 36Chapter XXXVI4 min
  37. 37Fragments: From Hippodamus, on Felicity7 min
  38. 38Fragments: From Euryphamus, on Human Life4 min
  39. 39Fragments: From Hipparchus, on Tranquillity5 min
  40. 40Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man10 min
  41. 41Fragments: From Theages, on the Virtues4 min left
  42. 42Fragments: From Metopus, on Virtue3 min
  43. 43Fragments: From Clinias1 min
  44. 44Fragments: From Theages, on the Virtues (II)9 min
  45. 45Fragments: From Archytas, on Ethical Erudition2 min
  46. 46Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man (II)1 min
  47. 47Fragments: From Crito, on Prudence and Prosperity4 min
  48. 48Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man (III)1 min
  49. 49Fragments: From Archytas, on Disciplines1 min
  50. 50Fragments: From Polus, on Justice4 min
  51. 51Pythagoric Ethical Sentences from Stobæus7 min
  52. 52Select Sentences of Sextus the Pythagorean7 min
  53. 53Pythagoric Sentences from the Protreptics of Iamblichus2 min
  54. 54Additional Notes67 min