Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras

Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras · Iamblichus

Fragments: From Metopus, on Virtue

Translated by Thomas Taylor (1818) · 42 of 54

The virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according to the proper nature of its virtue. Thus the virtue of a horse, is that which leads the nature of a horse to its summit. And the same reasoning is applicable to the several parts of a thing. Thus the virtue of the eyes is acuteness of vision: and this in the nature of the eyes is the summit. The virtue of the ears also, is acuteness of hearing: and this is the summit of the nature of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of the feet is swiftness: and this is the summit of the nature of the feet. It is necessary however, that every virtue should have these three things, reason, power, and deliberate choice; reason indeed, by which it judges and contemplates; power, by which it prohibits and vanquishes; and deliberate choice, by which it loves and delights in [what is proper]. To judge therefore, and contemplate, pertain to the dianoetic part of the soul; but to prohibit and vanquish are the peculiarity of the irrational part of the soul; and to love and delight in what is proper, pertain to both the rational and irrational parts. For deliberate choice consists of dianoia [or the discursive energy of reason] and appetite. Dianoia therefore, belongs to the rational, but appetite to the irrational part of the soul. The multitude however, of all the virtues, may be perceived from the parts of the soul; and in a similar manner the generation and nature of virtue. For of the parts of the soul, there are two that rank as the first, viz. the rational and the irrational parts. And the rational part indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire. These however, are either concordant or discordant with each other. But the contest and dissonance between them, are produced through excess and defect. It is evident therefore, that when the rational vanquishes the irrational part of the soul, endurance and continence are produced; and that when the former leads, and the latter follows, and both accord with each other, then virtue is generated. Hence, endurance and continence are generated accompanied with pain; but endurance resists pain, and continence pleasure. Incontinence however, and effeminacy, neither resist nor vanquish [pleasure]. And on this account it happens that men fly from good through pain, but reject it through pleasure. Praise likewise, and blame, and every thing beautiful in human conduct are produced in these parts of the soul. And in short, the nature of virtue derives its subsistence after this manner.

The species however, and the parts of it, may be surveyed as follows: Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational; the latter is divided into the irascible and appetitive. And the rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire. And of this, that which is as it were adapted to defend us, and revenge incidental molestations, is denominated the irascible part; but that which is as it were orectic of, and desires to preserve the proper constitution of the body, is the appetitive part. It is evident therefore, that the multitude of the virtues, their differences, and their peculiarities, follow conformably to these parts of the soul.

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Fragments: From Clinias

Every virtue is perfected, as was shown by us in the beginning, from reason, deliberate choice, and power.

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Contents

Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras · Iamblichus

54 chapters

  1. 01Chapter I2 min
  2. 02Chapter II6 min
  3. 03Chapter III4 min
  4. 04Chapter IV1 min
  5. 05Chapter V6 min
  6. 06Chapter VI3 min
  7. 07Chapter VII2 min
  8. 08Chapter VIII6 min
  9. 09Chapter IX5 min
  10. 10Chapter X2 min
  11. 11Chapter XI3 min
  12. 12Chapter XII2 min
  13. 13Chapter XIII2 min
  14. 14Chapter XIV2 min
  15. 15Chapter XV4 min
  16. 16Chapter XVI3 min
  17. 17Chapter XVII7 min
  18. 18Chapter XVIII9 min
  19. 19Chapter XIX4 min
  20. 20Chapter XX3 min
  21. 21Chapter XXI3 min
  22. 22Chapter XXII2 min
  23. 23Chapter XXIII3 min
  24. 24Chapter XXIV3 min
  25. 25Chapter XXV3 min
  26. 26Chapter XXVI6 min
  27. 27Chapter XXVII9 min
  28. 28Chapter XXVIII17 min
  29. 29Chapter XXIX8 min
  30. 30Chapter XXX14 min
  31. 31Chapter XXXI17 min
  32. 32Chapter XXXII10 min
  33. 33Chapter XXXIII9 min
  34. 34Chapter XXXIV5 min
  35. 35Chapter XXXV12 min
  36. 36Chapter XXXVI4 min
  37. 37Fragments: From Hippodamus, on Felicity7 min
  38. 38Fragments: From Euryphamus, on Human Life4 min
  39. 39Fragments: From Hipparchus, on Tranquillity5 min
  40. 40Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man10 min
  41. 41Fragments: From Theages, on the Virtues4 min
  42. 42Fragments: From Metopus, on Virtue3 min left
  43. 43Fragments: From Clinias1 min
  44. 44Fragments: From Theages, on the Virtues (II)9 min
  45. 45Fragments: From Archytas, on Ethical Erudition2 min
  46. 46Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man (II)1 min
  47. 47Fragments: From Crito, on Prudence and Prosperity4 min
  48. 48Fragments: From Archytas, on the Good and Happy Man (III)1 min
  49. 49Fragments: From Archytas, on Disciplines1 min
  50. 50Fragments: From Polus, on Justice4 min
  51. 51Pythagoric Ethical Sentences from Stobæus7 min
  52. 52Select Sentences of Sextus the Pythagorean7 min
  53. 53Pythagoric Sentences from the Protreptics of Iamblichus2 min
  54. 54Additional Notes67 min