Nicomachean Ethics

Nicomachean Ethics · Aristotle

Book I: Chapter 7.

Translated by W.D. Ross (1908) · 7 of 116

Chapter 7. The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of happiness reached by considering the characteristic function of man. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others--if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be?

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Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.

Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g.

a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

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Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry.

For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways.

But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

Up next

Book I: Chapter 8.

Chapter 8. This definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness. We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash.

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Contents

Nicomachean Ethics · Aristotle

116 chapters

  1. 01Book I: The Good for Man2 min
  2. 02Book I: Chapter 2.2 min
  3. 03Book I: Chapter 3.2 min
  4. 04Book I: Chapter 4.3 min
  5. 05Book I: Chapter 5.2 min
  6. 06Book I: Chapter 6.5 min
  7. 07Book I: Chapter 7.7 min left
  8. 08Book I: Chapter 8.4 min
  9. 09Book I: Chapter 9.3 min
  10. 10Book I: Chapter 10.5 min
  11. 11Book I: Chapter 11.2 min
  12. 12Book I: Chapter 12.2 min
  13. 13Book I: Chapter 13.5 min
  14. 14Book II: Moral Virtue3 min
  15. 15Book II: Chapter 2.3 min
  16. 16Book II: Chapter 3.3 min
  17. 17Book II: Chapter 4.3 min
  18. 18Book II: Chapter 5.2 min
  19. 19Book II: Chapter 6.5 min
  20. 20Book II: Chapter 7.5 min
  21. 21Book II: Chapter 8.3 min
  22. 22Book II: Chapter 9.3 min
  23. 23Book III: Moral Virtue8 min
  24. 24Book III: Chapter 2.4 min
  25. 25Book III: Chapter 3.5 min
  26. 26Book III: Chapter 4.2 min
  27. 27Book III: Chapter 5.7 min
  28. 28Book III: Chapter 6.3 min
  29. 29Book III: Chapter 7.4 min
  30. 30Book III: Chapter 8.5 min
  31. 31Book III: Chapter 9.2 min
  32. 32Book III: Chapter 10.4 min
  33. 33Book III: Chapter 11.3 min
  34. 34Book III: Chapter 12.3 min
  35. 35Book IV: Moral Virtue11 min
  36. 36Book IV: Chapter 2.6 min
  37. 37Book IV: Chapter 3.9 min
  38. 38Book IV: Chapter 4.2 min
  39. 39Book IV: Chapter 5.4 min
  40. 40Book IV: Chapter 6.3 min
  41. 41Book IV: Chapter 7.4 min
  42. 42Book IV: Chapter 8.3 min
  43. 43Book IV: Chapter 9.2 min
  44. 44Book V: Moral Virtue5 min
  45. 45Book V: Chapter 2.4 min
  46. 46Book V: Chapter 3.4 min
  47. 47Book V: Chapter 4.4 min
  48. 48Book V: Chapter 5.6 min
  49. 49Book V: Chapter 6.3 min
  50. 50Book V: Chapter 7.3 min
  51. 51Book V: Chapter 8.4 min
  52. 52Book V: Chapter 9.6 min
  53. 53Book V: Chapter 10.3 min
  54. 54Book V: Chapter 11.4 min
  55. 55Book VI: Intellectual Virtue3 min
  56. 56Book VI: Chapter 2.2 min
  57. 57Book VI: Chapter 3.2 min
  58. 58Book VI: Chapter 4.2 min
  59. 59Book VI: Chapter 5.3 min
  60. 60Book VI: Chapter 6.1 min