The Consolation of Philosophy

The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius

Book III, Prose X

Translated by H.R. James (1897) · 48 of 78

'Since now thou hast seen what is the form of the imperfect good, and what the form of the perfect also, methinks I should next show in what manner this perfection of felicity is built up. And here I conceive it proper to inquire, first, whether any excellence, such as thou hast lately defined, can exist in the nature of things, lest we be deceived by an empty fiction of thought to which no true reality answers. But it cannot be denied that such does exist, and is, as it were, the source of all things good. For everything which is called imperfect is spoken of as imperfect by reason of the privation of some perfection; so it comes to pass that, whenever imperfection is found in any particular, there must necessarily be a perfection in respect of that particular also. For were there no such perfection, it is utterly inconceivable how that so-called imperfection should come into existence. Nature does not make a beginning with things mutilated and imperfect; she starts with what is whole and perfect, and falls away later to these feeble and inferior productions. So if there is, as we showed before, a happiness of a frail and imperfect kind, it cannot be doubted but there is also a happiness substantial and perfect.'

'Most true is thy conclusion, and most sure,' said I.

'Next to consider where the dwelling-place of this happiness may be. The common belief of all mankind agrees that God, the supreme of all things, is good. For since nothing can be imagined better than God, how can we doubt Him to be good than whom there is nothing better? Now, reason shows God to be good in such wise as to prove that in Him is perfect good. For were it not so, He would not be supreme of all things; for there would be something else more excellent, possessed of perfect good, which would seem to have the advantage in priority and dignity, since it has clearly appeared that all perfect things are prior to those less complete. Wherefore, lest we fall into an infinite regression, we must acknowledge the supreme God to be full of supreme and perfect good. But we have determined that true happiness is the perfect good; therefore true happiness must dwell in the supreme Deity.'

'I accept thy reasonings,' said I; 'they cannot in any wise be disputed.'

'But, come, see how strictly and incontrovertibly thou mayst prove this our assertion that the supreme Godhead hath fullest possession of the highest good.'

'In what way, pray?' said I.

'Do not rashly suppose that He who is the Father of all things hath received that highest good of which He is said to be possessed either from some external source, or hath it as a natural endowment in such sort that thou mightest consider the essence of the happiness possessed, and of the God who possesses it, distinct and different. For if thou deemest it received from without, thou mayst esteem that which gives more excellent than that which has received. But Him we most worthily acknowledge to be the most supremely excellent of all things. If, however, it is in Him by nature, yet is logically distinct, the thought is inconceivable, since we are speaking of God, who is supreme of all things. Who was there to join these distinct essences? Finally, when one thing is different from another, the things so conceived as distinct cannot be identical. Therefore that which of its own nature is distinct from the highest good is not itself the highest good—an impious thought of Him than whom, 'tis plain, nothing can be more excellent. For universally nothing can be better in nature than the source from which it has come; therefore on most true grounds of reason would I conclude that which is the source of all things to be in its own essence the highest good.'

'And most justly,' said I.

'But the highest good has been admitted to be happiness.'

'Yes.'

'Then,' said she, 'it is necessary to acknowledge that God is very happiness.'

'Yes,' said I; 'I cannot gainsay my former admissions, and I see clearly that this is a necessary inference therefrom.'

'Reflect, also,' said she, 'whether the same conclusion is not further confirmed by considering that there cannot be two supreme goods distinct one from the other. For the goods which are different clearly cannot be severally each what the other is: wherefore neither of the two can be perfect, since to either the other is wanting; but since it is not perfect, it cannot manifestly be the supreme good. By no means, then, can goods which are supreme be different one from the other. But we have concluded that both happiness and God are the supreme good; wherefore that which is highest Divinity must also itself necessarily be supreme happiness.'

'No conclusion,' said I, 'could be truer to fact, nor more soundly reasoned out, nor more worthy of God.'

'Then, further,' said she, 'just as geometricians are wont to draw inferences from their demonstrations to which they give the name deductions, so will I add here a sort of corollary. For since men become happy by the acquisition of happiness, while happiness is very Godship, it is manifest that they become happy by the acquisition of Godship. But as by the acquisition of justice men become just, and wise by the acquisition of wisdom, so by parity of reasoning by acquiring Godship they must of necessity become gods. So every man who is happy is a god; and though in nature God is One only, yet there is nothing to hinder that very many should be gods by participation in that nature.'

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'A fair conclusion, and a precious,' said I, 'deduction or corollary, by whichever name thou wilt call it.'

'And yet,' said she, 'not one whit fairer than this which reason persuades us to add.'

'Why, what?' said I.

'Why, seeing happiness has many particulars included under it, should all these be regarded as forming one body of happiness, as it were, made up of various parts, or is there some one of them which forms the full essence of happiness, while all the rest are relative to this?'

'I would thou wouldst unfold the whole matter to me at large.'

'We judge happiness to be good, do we not?'

'Yea, the supreme good.'

'And this superlative applies to all; for this same happiness is adjudged to be the completest independence, the highest power, reverence, renown, and pleasure.'

'What then?'

'Are all these goods—independence, power, and the rest—to be deemed members of happiness, as it were, or are they all relative to good as to their summit and crown?'

'I understand the problem, but I desire to hear how thou wouldst solve it.'

'Well, then, listen to the determination of the matter. Were all these members composing happiness, they would differ severally one from the other. For this is the nature of parts—that by their difference they compose one body. All these, however, have been proved to be the same; therefore they cannot possibly be members, otherwise happiness will seem to be built up out of one member, which cannot be.'

'There can be no doubt as to that,' said I; 'but I am impatient to hear what remains.'

'Why, it is manifest that all the others are relative to the good. For the very reason why independence is sought is that it is judged good, and so power also, because it is believed to be good. The same, too, may be supposed of reverence, of renown, and of pleasant delight. Good, then, is the sum and source of all desirable things. That which has not in itself any good, either in reality or in semblance, can in no wise be desired. Contrariwise, even things which by nature are not good are desired as if they were truly good, if they seem to be so. Whereby it comes to pass that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum and hinge and cause of all things desirable. Now, that for the sake of which anything is desired itself seems to be most wished for. For instance, if anyone wishes to ride for the sake of health, he does not so much wish for the exercise of riding as the benefit of his health. Since, then, all things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not these so much as good itself that is sought by all. But that on account of which all other things are wished for was, we agreed, happiness; wherefore thus also it appears that it is happiness alone which is sought. From all which it is transparently clear that the essence of absolute good and of happiness is one and the same.'

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'I cannot see how anyone can dissent from these conclusions.'

'But we have also proved that God and true happiness are one and the same.'

'Yes,' said I.

'Then we can safely conclude, also, that God's essence is seated in absolute good, and nowhere else.'

Up next

Book III, Song X: The True Light

Hither come, all ye whose minds Lust with rosy fetters binds— Lust to bondage hard compelling Th' earthy souls that are his dwelling— Here shall be your labour's close; Here your haven of repose.

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Contents

The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius

78 chapters

  1. 01Book I, Song I: Boethius' Complaint2 min
  2. 02Book I, Prose I3 min
  3. 03Book I, Song II: His Despondency1 min
  4. 04Book I, Prose II1 min
  5. 05Book I, Song III: The Mists dispelled1 min
  6. 06Book I, Prose III3 min
  7. 07Book I, Song IV: Nothing can subdue Virtue1 min
  8. 08Book I, Prose IV9 min
  9. 09Book I, Song V: Boethius' Prayer2 min
  10. 10Book I, Prose V3 min
  11. 11Book I, Song VI: All Things have their Needful Order1 min
  12. 12Book I, Prose VI4 min
  13. 13Book I, Song VII: The Perturbations of Passion1 min
  14. 14Book II, Prose I4 min
  15. 15Book II, Song I: Fortune's Malice1 min
  16. 16Book II, Prose II3 min
  17. 17Book II, Song II: Man's Covetousness1 min
  18. 18Book II, Prose III3 min
  19. 19Book II, Song III: All passes1 min
  20. 20Book II, Prose IV6 min
  21. 21Book II, Song IV: The Golden Mean1 min
  22. 22Book II, Prose V6 min
  23. 23Book II, Song V: The Former Age1 min
  24. 24Book II, Prose VI4 min
  25. 25Book II, Song VI: Nero's Infamy1 min
  26. 26Book II, Prose VII4 min
  27. 27Book II, Song VII: Glory may not last1 min
  28. 28Book II, Prose VIII2 min
  29. 29Book II, Song VIII: Love is Lord of all1 min
  30. 30Book III, Prose I2 min
  31. 31Book III, Song I: The Thorns of Error1 min
  32. 32Book III, Prose II4 min
  33. 33Book III, Song II: The Bent of Nature2 min
  34. 34Book III, Prose III3 min
  35. 35Book III, Song III: The Insatiableness of Avarice1 min
  36. 36Book III, Prose IV3 min
  37. 37Book III, Song IV: Disgrace of Honours conferred by a Tyrant1 min
  38. 38Book III, Prose V2 min
  39. 39Book III, Song V: Self-mastery1 min
  40. 40Book III, Prose VI2 min
  41. 41Book III, Song VI: True Nobility1 min
  42. 42Book III, Prose VII1 min
  43. 43Book III, Song VII: Pleasure's Sting1 min
  44. 44Book III, Prose VIII2 min
  45. 45Book III, Song VIII: Human Folly1 min
  46. 46Book III, Prose IX5 min
  47. 47Book III, Song IX: Invocation2 min
  48. 48Book III, Prose X7 min left
  49. 49Book III, Song X: The True Light1 min
  50. 50Book III, Prose XI6 min
  51. 51Book III, Song XI: Reminiscence1 min
  52. 52Book III, Prose XII6 min
  53. 53Book III, Song XII: Orpheus and Eurydice2 min
  54. 54Book IV, Prose I2 min
  55. 55Book IV, Song I: The Soul's Flight1 min
  56. 56Book IV, Prose II7 min
  57. 57Book IV, Song II: The Bondage of Passion1 min
  58. 58Book IV, Prose III4 min
  59. 59Book IV, Song III: Circe's Cup2 min
  60. 60Book IV, Prose IV8 min