The Consolation of Philosophy

The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius

Book V, Prose IV

Translated by H.R. James (1897) · 74 of 78

Then said she: 'This debate about providence is an old one, and is vigorously discussed by Cicero in his Divination; thou also hast long and earnestly pondered the problem, yet no one has had diligence and perseverance enough to find a solution. And the reason of this obscurity is that the movement of human reasoning cannot cope with the simplicity of the Divine foreknowledge; for if a conception of its nature could in any wise be framed, no shadow of uncertainty would remain. With a view of making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the arguments by which thou art swayed. First, I inquire into the reasons why thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the effect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause of the necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any hindrance to the freedom of the will. Now, surely the sole ground on which thou arguest the necessity of the future is that things which are foreknown cannot fail to come to pass. But if, as thou wert ready to acknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things future, what reason is there for supposing the results of voluntary action constrained to a fixed issue? Suppose, for the sake of argument, and to see what follows, we assume that there is no foreknowledge. Are willed actions, then, tied down to any necessity in this case?'

'Certainly not.'

'Let us assume foreknowledge again, but without its involving any actual necessity; the freedom of the will, I imagine, will remain in complete integrity. But thou wilt say that, even although the foreknowledge is not the necessity of the future event's occurrence, yet it is a sign that it will necessarily happen. Granted; but in this case it is plain that, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the issues would have been inevitably certain. For a sign only indicates something which is, does not bring to pass that of which it is the sign. We require to show beforehand that all things, without exception, happen of necessity in order that a preconception may be a sign of this necessity. Otherwise, if there is no such universal necessity, neither can any preconception be a sign of a necessity which exists not. Manifestly, too, a proof established on firm grounds of reason must be drawn not from signs and loose general arguments, but from suitable and necessary causes. But how can it be that things foreseen should ever fail to come to pass? Why, this is to suppose us to believe that the events which providence foresees to be coming were not about to happen, instead of our supposing that, although they should come to pass, yet there was no necessity involved in their own nature compelling their occurrence. Take an illustration that will help to convey my meaning. There are many things which we see taking place before our eyes—the movements of charioteers, for instance, in guiding and turning their cars, and so on. Now, is any one of these movements compelled by any necessity?'

'No; certainly not. There would be no efficacy in skill if all motions took place perforce.'

'Then, things which in taking place are free from any necessity as to their being in the present must also, before they take place, be about to happen without necessity. Wherefore there are things which will come to pass, the occurrence of which is perfectly free from necessity. At all events, I imagine that no one will deny that things now taking place were about to come to pass before they were actually happening. Such things, however much foreknown, are in their occurrence free. For even as knowledge of things present imports no necessity into things that are taking place, so foreknowledge of the future imports none into things that are about to come. But this, thou wilt say, is the very point in dispute—whether any foreknowing is possible of things whose occurrence is not necessary. For here there seems to thee a contradiction, and, if they are foreseen, their necessity follows; whereas if there is no necessity, they can by no means be foreknown; and thou thinkest that nothing can be grasped as known unless it is certain, but if things whose occurrence is uncertain are foreknown as certain, this is the very mist of opinion, not the truth of knowledge. For to think of things otherwise than as they are, thou believest to be incompatible with the soundness of knowledge.

'Now, the cause of the mistake is this—that men think that all knowledge is cognized purely by the nature and efficacy of the thing known. Whereas the case is the very reverse: all that is known is grasped not conformably to its own efficacy, but rather conformably to the faculty of the knower. An example will make this clear: the roundness of a body is recognised in one way by sight, in another by touch. Sight looks upon it from a distance as a whole by a simultaneous reflection of rays; touch grasps the roundness piecemeal, by contact and attachment to the surface, and by actual movement round the periphery itself. Man himself, likewise, is viewed in one way by Sense, in another by Imagination, in another way, again, by Thought, in another by pure Intelligence. Sense judges figure clothed in material substance, Imagination figure alone without matter. Thought transcends this again, and by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which is contained in the individual. The eye of Intelligence is yet more exalted; for overpassing the sphere of the universal, it will behold absolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's vision. Wherein the main point to be considered is this: the higher faculty of comprehension embraces the lower, while the lower cannot rise to the higher. For Sense has no efficacy beyond matter, nor can Imagination behold universal ideas, nor Thought embrace pure form; but Intelligence, looking down, as it were, from its higher standpoint in its intuition of form, discriminates also the several elements which underlie it; but it comprehends them in the same way as it comprehends that form itself, which could be cognized by no other than itself. For it cognizes the universal of Thought, the figure of Imagination, and the matter of Sense, without employing Thought, Imagination, or Sense, but surveying all things, so to speak, under the aspect of pure form by a single flash of intuition. Thought also, in considering the universal, embraces images and sense-impressions without resorting to Imagination or Sense. For it is Thought which has thus defined the universal from its conceptual point of view: Man is a two-legged animal endowed with reason. This is indeed a universal notion, yet no one is ignorant that the thing is imaginable and presentable to Sense, because Thought considers it not by Imagination or Sense, but by means of rational conception. Imagination, too, though its faculty of viewing and forming representations is founded upon the senses, nevertheless surveys sense-impressions without calling in Sense, not in the way of Sense-perception, but of Imagination. See'st thou, then, how all things in cognizing use rather their own faculty than the faculty of the things which they cognize? Nor is this strange; for since every judgment is the act of the judge, it is necessary that each should accomplish its task by its own, not by another's power.'

Up next

Book V, Song IV: A Psychological Fallacy

From the Porch's murky depths Comes a doctrine sage, That doth liken living mind To a written page; Since all knowledge comes through Sense, Graven by Experience.

About 1 min to read

Take your library with you

Listen to this chapter

Opens this chapter in the app. Tap Listen to begin. Narration requires membership.

Scan to open this chapter
Continue to the next chapter

Open the next chapter in the app. Reading is free.

Scan to open the next chapter

Every book is free to read. Downloading the app may not keep this chapter link; return here to open it after installing.

Contents

The Consolation of Philosophy · Boethius

78 chapters

  1. 01Book I, Song I: Boethius' Complaint2 min
  2. 02Book I, Prose I3 min
  3. 03Book I, Song II: His Despondency1 min
  4. 04Book I, Prose II1 min
  5. 05Book I, Song III: The Mists dispelled1 min
  6. 06Book I, Prose III3 min
  7. 07Book I, Song IV: Nothing can subdue Virtue1 min
  8. 08Book I, Prose IV9 min
  9. 09Book I, Song V: Boethius' Prayer2 min
  10. 10Book I, Prose V3 min
  11. 11Book I, Song VI: All Things have their Needful Order1 min
  12. 12Book I, Prose VI4 min
  13. 13Book I, Song VII: The Perturbations of Passion1 min
  14. 14Book II, Prose I4 min
  15. 15Book II, Song I: Fortune's Malice1 min
  16. 16Book II, Prose II3 min
  17. 17Book II, Song II: Man's Covetousness1 min
  18. 18Book II, Prose III3 min
  19. 19Book II, Song III: All passes1 min
  20. 20Book II, Prose IV6 min
  21. 21Book II, Song IV: The Golden Mean1 min
  22. 22Book II, Prose V6 min
  23. 23Book II, Song V: The Former Age1 min
  24. 24Book II, Prose VI4 min
  25. 25Book II, Song VI: Nero's Infamy1 min
  26. 26Book II, Prose VII4 min
  27. 27Book II, Song VII: Glory may not last1 min
  28. 28Book II, Prose VIII2 min
  29. 29Book II, Song VIII: Love is Lord of all1 min
  30. 30Book III, Prose I2 min
  31. 31Book III, Song I: The Thorns of Error1 min
  32. 32Book III, Prose II4 min
  33. 33Book III, Song II: The Bent of Nature2 min
  34. 34Book III, Prose III3 min
  35. 35Book III, Song III: The Insatiableness of Avarice1 min
  36. 36Book III, Prose IV3 min
  37. 37Book III, Song IV: Disgrace of Honours conferred by a Tyrant1 min
  38. 38Book III, Prose V2 min
  39. 39Book III, Song V: Self-mastery1 min
  40. 40Book III, Prose VI2 min
  41. 41Book III, Song VI: True Nobility1 min
  42. 42Book III, Prose VII1 min
  43. 43Book III, Song VII: Pleasure's Sting1 min
  44. 44Book III, Prose VIII2 min
  45. 45Book III, Song VIII: Human Folly1 min
  46. 46Book III, Prose IX5 min
  47. 47Book III, Song IX: Invocation2 min
  48. 48Book III, Prose X7 min
  49. 49Book III, Song X: The True Light1 min
  50. 50Book III, Prose XI6 min
  51. 51Book III, Song XI: Reminiscence1 min
  52. 52Book III, Prose XII6 min
  53. 53Book III, Song XII: Orpheus and Eurydice2 min
  54. 54Book IV, Prose I2 min
  55. 55Book IV, Song I: The Soul's Flight1 min
  56. 56Book IV, Prose II7 min
  57. 57Book IV, Song II: The Bondage of Passion1 min
  58. 58Book IV, Prose III4 min
  59. 59Book IV, Song III: Circe's Cup2 min
  60. 60Book IV, Prose IV8 min