Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 30 of 103

Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 8-10

The non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the object of the term ‘Self’ because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, ‘That is the Self,’ and where the subsequent clause, ‘That art thou, O Svetaketu,’ declares the intelligent Svetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. ‘a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect’) declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhâna were denoted by the term ‘Sat’ and did comprehend—by means of the phrase ‘That art thou’—persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ‘Thou art non-intelligent;’ so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless sâstra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the sâstra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would—comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox’s tail 1—cling to the view of that being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from what constitutes man’s good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the sâstra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ‘that is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,’ teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Kh. Up. VI, 16).

For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ‘that art thou’ would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, ‘I am the hymn’ (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ‘Self is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word ‘Self’ can—in such phrases as ‘Bhadrasena is my Self’—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by perception.

Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ‘Self’ may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word ‘gyotis’ signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ‘Self’ in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as ‘the Self of the elements,’ ‘the Self of the senses.’ And even if we assume that the word ‘Self’ primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with Svetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word ‘Self’ here to be something intelligent. The word ‘gyotis’ does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of ‘light’ only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavâda assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sûtra is also possible. The preceding Sûtra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word ‘Self’ having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sûtra is to be explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhâna is not denoted by the word ‘Self.’ This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

Footnotes 55:1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.

56:1 Cp. above, p. 30.

8.And (the pradhâna cannot be denoted by the word ‘Self’) because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the pradhâna which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term ‘Being’ (Sat), and if the passage ‘That is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,’ referred to the pradhâna; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhâna is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhâna, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhatî at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying ‘that is Arundhatî,’ although it is really not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhatî. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhâna. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapâthaka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).

The word ‘and’ (in the Sûtra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhâna is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapâthaka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, ‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,’ &c. Now if the term ‘Sat’ denoted the pradhâna, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhâna. Therefore the pradhâna is not denoted by the term ‘Sat.’—For this the Sûtrakâra gives a further reason.

9.On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhâna).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word ‘Sat,’ Scripture says, ‘When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, “he sleeps” (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apîta).’ (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1.) This passage explains the well-known verb ‘to sleep,’ with reference to the soul. The word, ‘his own,’ denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.

into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which means ‘to be resolved into.’ The individual soul (gîva) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind—which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects 1. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term ‘mind 2.’ When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e.

the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word ‘hridaya’ is given by sruti, ‘That Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the heart (hridi ayam).’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words asanâya and udanyâ are similarly etymologised: ‘water is carrying away what has been eaten by him;’ ‘fire carries away what has been drunk by him’ (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term ‘Sat,’ by means of the etymology of the word ‘sleep.’ But the intelligent

Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, again, it were said that the pradhâna is denoted by the word ‘own,’ because belonging to the Self (as being the Self’s own), there would remain the same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. ‘embraced by the intelligent—prâgña—Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,’ Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word ‘Sat,’ and not the pradhâna.—A further reason for the pradhâna not being the cause is subjoined.

Footnotes 59:1 So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.

59:2 With reference to Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2.

10.On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedânta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).