Vedanta-Sutras Part I

Vedanta-Sutras Part I · Badarayana

Introduction (Part 7)

Translated by George Thibaut · 7 of 103

The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to Sankara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The Srî-bhâshya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed.

Translated according to Râmânuga's view, the Sûtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuga puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears from a quotation made by Râmânuga from the Dramidabhâshyakâra 1.

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vaiseshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of Sankara and Râmânuga on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtra-kâra remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras constituting this adhikarana are treated by Sankara on the one hand and Râmânuga on the other is characteristic. Râmânuga throughout simply follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. Sankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Sankara, because the world is unreal; according to Râmânuga, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

PÂDA II. The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first adhikarana (1-10) is directed against the Sânkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikarana (11-17) refutes the

Vaiseshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrishta.--The third and fourth adhikaranas are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vigñânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikarana is treated by Râmânuga as a separate adhikarana refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Gainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikarana of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâñkarâtras. But Sankara and Râmânuga totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sankarshana, i.e. the gîva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarshana there springs Pradyumna, i. e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to Sankara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarshana, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--

According to Râmânuga, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is non-contradiction of that (i.e. the Pañkarâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sankarshana and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâñkarâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuga's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Sankara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

PÂDA III. The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i. e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikaranas treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the gîva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by Sankara on the one hand and Râmânuga on the other. According to the former, the gîva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Râmânuga, the gîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman.

So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e.

they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sankoka)

which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra declares that the soul is 'gña.' This means, according to Sankara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vaiseshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Râmânuga, on the other hand, explains 'gña' by 'gñatri,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed not only against the Vaiseshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the Sânkhyas and the Vedântins of Sankara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure kaitanya.--The wording of the Sûtra certainly seems to favour Râmânuga's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term gña of which the most obvious interpretation gñâtri, not gñânam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is anu, i. e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In Sankara's opinion the Sûtras 19-38 represent the pûrvapaksha view, according to which the gîva is anu, while Sûtra 29 formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the gîva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as anu in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is anu--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the samsâra.--According to Râmânuga, on the other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikarana gives utterance to the siddhânta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the

Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gñâtri) stands to knowledge (gñâna).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--Sankara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a pûrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29.

What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere primâ facie view is carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system.

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Introduction (Part 8)

Still it is not altogether impossible that the pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with Sankara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading.

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Contents

Vedanta-Sutras Part I · Badarayana

103 chapters

  1. 01Introduction (Part 1)11 min
  2. 02Introduction (Part 2)11 min
  3. 03Introduction (Part 3)11 min
  4. 04Introduction (Part 4)10 min
  5. 05Introduction (Part 5)11 min
  6. 06Introduction (Part 6)10 min
  7. 07Introduction (Part 7)11 min left
  8. 08Introduction (Part 8)10 min
  9. 09Introduction (Part 9)11 min
  10. 10Introduction (Part 10)11 min
  11. 11Introduction (Part 11)11 min
  12. 12Introduction (Part 12)11 min
  13. 13Introduction (Part 13)10 min
  14. 14Introduction (Part 14)11 min
  15. 15Introduction (Part 15)11 min
  16. 16Introduction (Part 16)11 min
  17. 17Introduction (Part 17)11 min
  18. 18Introduction (Part 18)10 min
  19. 19Introduction (Part 19)4 min
  20. 20Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 19 min
  21. 21Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 2)9 min
  22. 22Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 3)9 min
  23. 23Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 49 min
  24. 24Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 5)9 min
  25. 25Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 6)9 min
  26. 26Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 7)9 min
  27. 27Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 8)9 min
  28. 28Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 59 min
  29. 29Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 68 min
  30. 30Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 8-109 min
  31. 31Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 118 min
  32. 32Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 13-199 min
  33. 33Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 14)9 min
  34. 34Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 20-229 min
  35. 35Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 239 min
  36. 36Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 249 min
  37. 37Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 25-289 min
  38. 38Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 29-318 min
  39. 39Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 20)7 min
  40. 40Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 2-59 min
  41. 41Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 6-1110 min
  42. 42Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutra 1210 min
  43. 43Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 13-1610 min
  44. 44Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 18-209 min
  45. 45Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 21-229 min
  46. 46Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 23-2410 min
  47. 47Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 26-299 min
  48. 48Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 30-325 min
  49. 49Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 1-710 min
  50. 50Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutra 89 min
  51. 51Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 9-119 min
  52. 52Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 12-149 min
  53. 53Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutra 169 min
  54. 54Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 17-1910 min
  55. 55Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 20-219 min
  56. 56Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 22-258 min
  57. 57Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 26-289 min
  58. 58Adhyaya I: Pada III (Part 10)8 min
  59. 59Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 29-309 min
  60. 60Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 31-329 min