Vedanta-Sutras Part I

Vedanta-Sutras Part I · Badarayana

Adhyaya I: Pada III (Part 10)

Translated by George Thibaut · 58 of 103

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection will be raised--in Sûtra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Âdityas, the Visvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Yagñadatta is given to him (lit. made for him) 2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the 'word.'

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species 3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavâdas, &c. Terms such as 'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the âkritis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Smriti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At the word these Pragâpati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the sastra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i. e. the word of the Veda.--Bri. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.--Smrti also delivers itself as follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhû, from which all activities proceeded. 'By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahesvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pragâpati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Brâ. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhûr he created the earth,' &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words bhûr, &c. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pragâpati).

Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the sphota, the pûrvapakshin says. 1 For on the assumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yagñadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted.

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Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption; 1 nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense.

For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception. 2 Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the sphote is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the sphota presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.--As that sphota is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the sphota and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again, can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced.

If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Yagñadatta reading.--Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves.

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Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 29-30

Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors.

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Contents

Vedanta-Sutras Part I · Badarayana

103 chapters

  1. 01Introduction (Part 1)11 min
  2. 02Introduction (Part 2)11 min
  3. 03Introduction (Part 3)11 min
  4. 04Introduction (Part 4)10 min
  5. 05Introduction (Part 5)11 min
  6. 06Introduction (Part 6)10 min
  7. 07Introduction (Part 7)11 min
  8. 08Introduction (Part 8)10 min
  9. 09Introduction (Part 9)11 min
  10. 10Introduction (Part 10)11 min
  11. 11Introduction (Part 11)11 min
  12. 12Introduction (Part 12)11 min
  13. 13Introduction (Part 13)10 min
  14. 14Introduction (Part 14)11 min
  15. 15Introduction (Part 15)11 min
  16. 16Introduction (Part 16)11 min
  17. 17Introduction (Part 17)11 min
  18. 18Introduction (Part 18)10 min
  19. 19Introduction (Part 19)4 min
  20. 20Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 19 min
  21. 21Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 2)9 min
  22. 22Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 3)9 min
  23. 23Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 49 min
  24. 24Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 5)9 min
  25. 25Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 6)9 min
  26. 26Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 7)9 min
  27. 27Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 8)9 min
  28. 28Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 59 min
  29. 29Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 68 min
  30. 30Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 8-109 min
  31. 31Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 118 min
  32. 32Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 13-199 min
  33. 33Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 14)9 min
  34. 34Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 20-229 min
  35. 35Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 239 min
  36. 36Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutra 249 min
  37. 37Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 25-289 min
  38. 38Adhyaya I: Pada I: Sutras 29-318 min
  39. 39Adhyaya I: Pada I (Part 20)7 min
  40. 40Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 2-59 min
  41. 41Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 6-1110 min
  42. 42Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutra 1210 min
  43. 43Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 13-1610 min
  44. 44Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 18-209 min
  45. 45Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 21-229 min
  46. 46Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 23-2410 min
  47. 47Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 26-299 min
  48. 48Adhyaya I: Pada II: Sutras 30-325 min
  49. 49Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 1-710 min
  50. 50Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutra 89 min
  51. 51Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 9-119 min
  52. 52Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 12-149 min
  53. 53Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutra 169 min
  54. 54Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 17-1910 min
  55. 55Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 20-219 min
  56. 56Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 22-258 min
  57. 57Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 26-289 min
  58. 58Adhyaya I: Pada III (Part 10)8 min left
  59. 59Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 29-309 min
  60. 60Adhyaya I: Pada III: Sutras 31-329 min