Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 73 of 103

Adhyaya I: Pada IV (Part 9)

The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the pûrvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the Brihadâranyaka passage represents as the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise; so Âsmarathya thinks.' The promise is made in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being 1; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different.

The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements; thus the teacher Âsmarathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul when it will depart is such; thus Audulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.

This is Audulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of the soul; thus Kâsakritsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Kâsakritsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The passage means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised--in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, 'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-connexion with the mâtrâs.' That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the mâtrâs, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the pûrvapakshin, viz. that the word 'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Kâsakritsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Yâgñavalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of Kâsakritsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedânta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is all this' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by Smriti; compare, for instance, 'Vâsudeva is all this' (Bha. Gî. VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bhârata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gî.

XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (Bri. Up.

IV, 24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedânta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (Is. Up. 7.)--And Smriti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gî. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul) 1. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedânta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal 2. (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

Footnotes 278:2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, 11.

279:1 And not the relation of absolute identity.

279:2 I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.

280:1 Upapâditam keti, sarvasyâtmamâtratvam iti seshah. Upapâdanaprakâram sûkayati eketi. Sa yathârdrendhanâgner ityâdinaikaprasavatvam, yathâ sarvâsâm apâm ityâdinâ kaikapralayatvam sarvasyoktam. Ân. Gi.

283:1 So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi., although their interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekâm of the text.--Kâmkid evaikâm iti gîvasthânâd anyâm ity arthah. Go. Ân.--Gîvabhâvena pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity arthah. Ân. Gi.

283:2 While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman, evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He reflected, he created prâna.' For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors 1. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another argument.

For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' Sve. Up. VI, 19).

Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Smriti 2, and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one,

'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known?'(Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (Kh. Up.