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Adhyaya II: Pada I: Sutras 2-3, read aloud

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Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 76 of 103

Adhyaya II: Pada I: Sutras 2-3

292:1 On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii, ff.--As will be seen later on, Sankara, in this bhâshya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some rishi.

293:1 I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.

294:1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is not mentioned in Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvâtmavâdin is mentioned there.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhâna, according to the Sânkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sânkhya) Smriti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smriti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Smriti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smriti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sûtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smritis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sânkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smriti) is refuted.

This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sânkhya-smriti the Yoga-smriti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sûtra does.)--We reply that here an additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon 1.' In the Svetâsvatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-sâstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the sâstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-smriti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smriti referring to the ashtakâs 2.--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sânkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smriti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Smriti and Sruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although 3 there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sânkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sânkhya and Yoga-smritis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sânkhya-smriti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice.

For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sânkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sânkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sânkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity 1. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda.

In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sânkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrâgaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Gâbâla Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smritis. If it be said that those Smritis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (Bri. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

Footnotes 297:1 In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.

297:2 The ashtakâs (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and sisira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that Smriti is authoritative in so far as it is based on Sruti.

297:3 But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sânkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Smritis conflicting with the Vedânta views?

298:1 I. e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Smriti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma),--(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e.

things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so Sruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.

Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition--sâkshâtkâra--of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect)'--The Vedântic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedântin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on.

It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master.