Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 90 of 103

Adhyaya II: Pada II: Sutras 3-7

To all this we—the Vedântins—make the following reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be raised—your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—If it finally be objected that (on the Vedânta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Mâyâ, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

Footnotes 368:1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.—Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsankya anumânâd ity âha, pravrittîti. Anumânasiddhasya ketanasya na pravrittyâsrayateti darsayitum evakârah. Katham anumânam ity apekshâyâm tatprakâram; sûkayati kevaleti. Vailakshanyam prânâdimattvam. Ân. Gi.

3.If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

Well, the Sânkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ‘He who dwells in the water and within the water, who rules the water within,’ Bri. Up. III, 7, 4; and, ‘By the command of that Akshara, O Gârgî, some rivers flow to the East,’ &c., Bri. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle 1 cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases—If, finally, our opponent should point to Sûtra II, 1, 24 as contradicting the present Sûtra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.

Footnotes 370:1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.—Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatvam sâdhyavati pakshe pravishtatvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyâpy upalakshanam, anpanyâso na vyabhikârabhûmir ity arthah. Ân. Gi.

4.And because (the pradhâna), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

The three gunas of the Sânkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the pradhâna. Beyond the pradhâna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhâna to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhâna stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being connected with the power of illusion (mâyâ).

5.Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).

Let this be (the Sânkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhâna also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we reply, ‘Because no such cause is observed.’ For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhâna is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply.—The transformation of the pradhâna might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? ‘Because it does not exist elsewhere.’ For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow’s body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only 1. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.—For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhâna cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

Footnotes 371:1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow’s body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.

6.Even if we admit (the Sânkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhâna).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sânkhya’s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sûtra, viz. that the pradhâna is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ‘on account of the absence of a purpose.’ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhâna has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhâna is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhâna does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) 1? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release 2.—If release, then the activity of the pradhâna would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c. 1—If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhâna to be enjoyed (by the soul) 2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhâna; for neither the non-intelligent pradhâna nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.—If, finally, you should assume the pradhâna to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhâna) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhâna does not cease at any time any more than the soul’s power of sight docs, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place 3.—It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhâna enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.

Footnotes 372:1 Anâdheyâtisayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâtisayasûnyasyety arthah. Ân. Gi.

372:2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims—ex hypothesi—only at the soul’s undergoing varied experience.

373:1 I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.

373:2 Tritîye#pi katipayasabdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva muktih syâd iti manvâno dvitîyam pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.

373:3 The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit samsârânukkhedât; the Bhâmatî’s reading is: Sargasaktyanukkhedavad driksaktyanukkhedât.

7.And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).