Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 97 of 103

Adhyaya II: Pada II: Sutras 21-22

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when examining the Vaiseshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in which the adrishta abides 1; how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the adrishta).--Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal samsâra the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.

Footnotes 404:1 The kâranatvât of Sankara explains the pratyayatvât of the Sûtra; kâryam praty ayate ganakatvena gakkhati.

404:2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyâbharana: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.--Impression (affection, samskâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vigñâna) is the self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavigñânasya vrittilâbhah) springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six (shadâyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (sparsa) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c.

on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedanâ) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire (trishnâ) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus--Species (gâti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay (garâ).--Death (maranam) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (soka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that account.--Pain (duhkha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

406:1 Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain: Âsrâyasrayibhûteshv iti bhoktriviseshanam adrishtâsrayeshv ity arthah.--The Brahma-vidyâbharana says: Nityeshv âsrâyasrayibhûteshv anushv abhyupagamyamâneshu bhoktrishu ka satsv ity anvayah. Âsrâyasrayibhûteshv ity asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity arthah.--And with regard to the subsequent âsrayâsrayisûnyeshu: âsrayâsrayitvasûnyeshu, ayam bhâvah, sthireshu paramânushu yadanvaye paramânûnâm samghâtâpattih yadvyatireke ka na tad upakârakam upakâryâh paramânavah yena tatkrito bhogah prârthyate sa tatra karteti grahîtum sakyate, kshanikeshu tu paramânushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekakshanasâdhyasyâsambhavân nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitum sakyah.--Ânanda Giri remarks on the latter: Adrishtâsrayakârtrirâhityam âhâsrayeti. Another reading appears to be âsayâsrayasûnyeshu.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its causal energy,--That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist).

And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases 1.--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles.

If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and 'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz.

the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

Footnotes 407:1 Bauddhânâm kshanapadena ghatâdir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu tadatinktah kaskit kshano nâma hâlo#sti. Brahmâvidyâbh.

408:1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes 1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely.

Footnotes 409:1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipatipratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyâbharana: Adhipatir indriyam tad dhi kakshurâdirûpam utpannasya gñânasya rûpâdivishayatâm niyakkhati niyâmakas ka loke#dhipatir ity ukyate. Sahakârî âlokah. Samanantarapratyayah pûrvagñânam, bauddhamate hi kshanikagñanasamtatau pûrvagñânam uttaragñâsya kâranam tad eva ka mana ity ukyate. Âlambanam ghatâdih. Etân hetûn pratîya prâpya kakshurâdiganyam ity âdi.

409:2 Samskâra iti, tanmate pûrvakshana eva hetubhûtah samskâro vâsaneti ka vyavahriyate kâryam tu tadvishayatayâ karmavyutpattyâ samskârah, tathâ ka kâryakâranâtmakam sarvam bhâvarûpam kshanikam iti pratigñârthah. Brahmavidyâbharana.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.