Creative Evolution

Creative Evolution · Henri Bergson

I · Radical Finalism

Translated by Arthur Mitchell (1911) · 6 of 50

But radical finalism is quite as unacceptable, and for the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in front of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past. But succession remains none the less a mere appearance, as indeed does movement itself. In the doctrine of Leibniz, time is reduced to a confused perception, relative to the human standpoint, a perception which would vanish, like a rising mist, for a mind seated at the centre of things.

Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine with fixed rigid outlines. It admits of as many inflections as we like. The mechanistic philosophy is to be taken or left: it must be left if the least grain of dust, by straying from the path foreseen by mechanics, should show the slightest trace of spontaneity. The doctrine of final causes, on the contrary, will never be definitively refuted. If one form of it be put aside, it will take another. Its principle, which is essentially psychological, is very flexible. It is so extensible, and thereby so comprehensive, that one accepts something of it as soon as one rejects pure mechanism. The theory we shall put forward in this book will therefore necessarily partake of finalism to a certain extent. For that reason it is important to intimate exactly what we are going to take of it, and what we mean to leave.

A doctrine that takes many formsMembership note · Open in the app

Let us say at once that to thin out the Leibnizian finalism by breaking it into an infinite number of pieces seems to us a step in the wrong direction. This is, however, the tendency of the doctrine of finality. It fully realizes that if the universe as a whole is the carrying out of a plan, this cannot be demonstrated empirically, and that even of the organized world alone it is hardly easier to prove all harmonious: facts would equally well testify to the contrary. Nature sets living beings at discord with one another. She everywhere presents disorder alongside of order, retrogression alongside of progress. But, though finality cannot be affirmed either of the whole of matter or of the whole of life, might it not yet be true, says the finalist, of each organism taken separately? Is there not a wonderful division of labor, a marvellous solidarity among the parts of an organism, perfect order in infinite complexity? Does not each living being thus realize a plan immanent in its substance?--This theory consists, at bottom, in breaking up the original notion of finality into bits. It does not accept, indeed it ridicules, the idea of an external finality, according to which living beings are ordered with regard to each other: to suppose the grass made for the cow, the lamb for the wolf--that is all acknowledged to be absurd. But there is, we are told, an internal finality: each being is made for itself, all its parts conspire for the greatest good of the whole and are intelligently organized in view of that end. Such is the notion of finality which has long been classic. Finalism has shrunk to the point of never embracing more than one living being at a time. By making itself smaller, it probably thought it would offer less surface for blows.

The truth is, it lay open to them a great deal more. Radical as our own theory may appear, finality is external or it is nothing at all.

Consider the most complex and the most harmonious organism. All the elements, we are told, conspire for the greatest good of the whole. Very well, but let us not forget that each of these elements may itself be an organism in certain cases, and that in subordinating the existence of this small organism to the life of the great one we accept the principle of an external finality. The idea of a finality that is always internal is therefore a self-destructive notion. An organism is composed of tissues, each of which lives for itself. The cells of which the tissues are made have also a certain independence. Strictly speaking, if the subordination of all the elements of the individual to the individual itself were complete, we might contend that they are not organisms, reserve the name organism for the individual, and recognize only internal finality. But every one knows that these elements may possess a true autonomy. To say nothing of phagocytes, which push independence to the point of attacking the organism that nourishes them, or of germinal cells, which have their own life alongside the somatic cells--the facts of regeneration are enough: here an element or a group of elements suddenly reveals that, however limited its normal space and function, it can transcend them occasionally; it may even, in certain cases, be regarded as the equivalent of the whole.

When a cell is also an organismMembership note · Open in the app

There lies the stumbling-block of the vitalistic theories. We shall not reproach them, as is ordinarily done, with replying to the question by the question itself: the "vital principle" may indeed not explain much, but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally,[21] while mechanism invites us to ignore that ignorance. But the position of vitalism is rendered very difficult by the fact that, in nature, there is neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality. The organized elements composing the individual have themselves a certain individuality, and each will claim its vital principle if the individual pretends to have its own. But, on the other hand, the individual itself is not sufficiently independent, not sufficiently cut off from other things, for us to allow it a "vital principle" of its own. An organism such as a higher vertebrate is the most individuated of all organisms; yet, if we take into account that it is only the development of an ovum forming part of the body of its mother and of a spermatozoon belonging to the body of its father, that the egg (i.e. the ovum fertilized) is a connecting link between the two progenitors since it is common to their two substances, we shall realize that every individual organism, even that of a man, is merely a bud that has sprouted on the combined body of both its parents. Where, then, does the vital principle of the individual begin or end? Gradually we shall be carried further and further back, up to the individual's remotest ancestors: we shall find him solidary with each of them, solidary with that little mass of protoplasmic jelly which is probably at the root of the genealogical tree of life. Being, to a certain extent, one with this primitive ancestor, he is also solidary with all that descends from the ancestor in divergent directions. In this sense each individual may be said to remain united with the totality of living beings by invisible bonds. So it is of no use to try to restrict finality to the individuality of the living being. If there is finality in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a single indivisible embrace. This life common to all the living undoubtedly presents many gaps and incoherences, and again it is not so mathematically one that it cannot allow each being to become individualized to a certain degree. But it forms a single whole, none the less; and we have to choose between the out-and-out negation of finality and the hypothesis which co-ordinates not only the parts of an organism with the organism itself, but also each living being with the collective whole of all others.

Finality will not go down any easier for being taken as a powder. Either the hypothesis of a finality immanent in life should be rejected as a whole, or it must undergo a treatment very different from pulverization.

Breaking finality into powderMembership note · Open in the app

Up next

I · Beyond Mechanism and Finalism

The error of radical finalism, as also that of radical mechanism, is to extend too far the application of certain concepts that are natural to our intellect.

About 14 min to read

Take your library with you

Continue to the next chapter

Open the next chapter in the app. Reading is free.

Scan to open the next chapter

Every book is free to read. Downloading the app may not keep this chapter link; return here to open it after installing.

Contents

Creative Evolution · Henri Bergson

50 chapters

  1. 01I · Of Duration in General10 min
  2. 02I · Unorganized Bodies and Abstract Time11 min
  3. 03I · Organized Bodies and Real Duration12 min
  4. 04I · Of Transformism12 min
  5. 05I · Mechanism and the Whole of Life10 min
  6. 06I · Radical Finalism7 min left
  7. 07I · Beyond Mechanism and Finalism14 min
  8. 08I · The Quest of a Criterion13 min
  9. 09I · The Eye: Darwin and De Vries11 min
  10. 10I · Identical Organs by Different Means9 min
  11. 11I · Neo-Lamarckism and Orthogenesis15 min
  12. 12I · The Vital Impetus14 min
  13. 13I · Footnotes6 min
  14. 14II · The Evolutionary Process and Adaptation11 min
  15. 15II · The Animal and the Plant12 min
  16. 16II · Torpor, Intelligence, and Instinct10 min
  17. 17II · Energy and the Nervous System7 min
  18. 18II · The Divergent Lines of Animal Life12 min
  19. 19II · Instinct and Intelligence15 min
  20. 20II · Two Modes of Knowledge13 min
  21. 21II · Intelligence and Inert Matter16 min
  22. 22II · The Nature of Instinct15 min
  23. 23II · Intuition, Consciousness, and the Place of Man13 min
  24. 24II · Footnotes4 min
  25. 25III · Knowledge and Life: The Method of Philosophy12 min
  26. 26III · Beyond the Pure Intellect9 min
  27. 27III · The Genesis of Matter and Space13 min
  28. 28III · Geometry and Deduction7 min
  29. 29III · Induction and Physical Laws9 min
  30. 30III · Two Kinds of Order11 min
  31. 31III · Order and the Idea of Disorder14 min
  32. 32III · Tension and Extension12 min
  33. 33III · Creation and the Genesis of Matter9 min
  34. 34III · The Impetus of Life and Creation14 min
  35. 35III · Consciousness, Mankind, and the Spirit15 min
  36. 36III · Footnotes4 min
  37. 37IV · The Idea of Nothing11 min
  38. 38IV · Negation and Affirmation15 min
  39. 39IV · The Illusion of the Void13 min
  40. 40IV · Form and Becoming8 min
  41. 41IV · The Cinematographical Method7 min
  42. 42IV · Zeno's Arrow and the Eleatics11 min
  43. 43IV · The Philosophy of Forms10 min
  44. 44IV · Plato and Aristotle on Change9 min
  45. 45IV · Becoming in Modern Science11 min
  46. 46IV · Two Views of Time15 min
  47. 47IV · Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz12 min
  48. 48IV · The Criticism of Kant13 min
  49. 49IV · The Evolutionism of Spencer10 min
  50. 50Translator's Footnotes3 min