All the Works of Epictetus · 13 of 100

Book I, Chapter 11

1. When one of the great Men came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the Particulars of his Affairs, asked him, Whether he had a Wife and Children? The other replying, that he had; Epictetus likewise inquired, In what Manner do you live with them? Very miserably, says he —— How so? For Men do not marry, and get Children, to be miserable; but rather to make themselves happy. —— But, I am so very miserable about my Children, that the other Day, when my Daughter was sick, and appeared to be in Danger; I could not bear even to be with her; but ran away, till it was told me that she was recovered. —— And pray do you think this was acting right? It was acting naturally, said he. —— Well: do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I will convince you that every thing natural is right. —— All, or most of us Fathers are affected in the same Way. —— I do not deny the Fact: but the Question between us is, whether it be right. For, by this Way of Reasoning, it must be said, that Tumours happen for the Good of the Body, because they do happen: and even that Vices are natural, because all or the most Part of us are guilty of them. Do you show me then how such a Behaviour as yours, appears to be natural.

I cannot undertake that. But do you rather show me, how it appears to be neither natural, nor right.

If we were disputing about Black and White, what Criterion must we call in, to distinguish them?

The Sight.

If about Hot and Cold, and Hard and Soft, what?

The Touch.

Well then: when we are debating about Natural and Unnatural, and Right and Wrong; what Criterion are we to take?

I cannot tell.

And yet, to be ignorant of a Criterion of Colours, or of Smells, or Tastes, might perhaps be no very great Loss. But do you think, that he suffers only a small Loss, who is ignorant of what is Good and Evil, and Natural and Unnatural, to Man?

No. The very greatest.

Well: tell me; Are all Things which are judged good and proper by some, rightly judged to be so? Is it possible, that the several Opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning Food, should all be right?

How can it be possible?

I suppose then, it is absolutely necessary, if the Opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong: if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad.

How can it be otherwise?

And where Ignorance is, there likewise is Want of Learning, and Instruction, in necessary Points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to acquaint yourself with the Criterion of what is agreeable to Nature: and to use that in judging of each particular Case.

2. At present the Assistance I have to give you, towards what you desire, is this. Doth Affection seem to you to be a right and a natural Thing?

How should it be otherwise?

Well: and is Affection natural and right, and Reason not so?

By no means.

Is there any Opposition, then, between Reason. and Affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two Opposites if one be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not?

It must.

What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reasonable, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then: you will not dispute, but that to run away, and leave a sick Child, is contrary to Reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with Affection.

Let us consider it.

Did you, then, from an Affection to your Child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her Mother no Affection for the Child?

Yes, surely, she hath.

Would it have been right, then, that her Mother too should leave her; or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her Nurse love her?

She doth.

Then ought not she likewise to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her Preceptor love her?

He doth.

Then ought not he also to have run away, and left her: and so the Child to have been left alone, and unassisted, from the great Affection of her Parents, and her Friends; or to die in the Hands of People, who neither loved her, nor took care of her.

Heaven forbid!

But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself, on the Account of your Affection; should not be allowed to others, who have the very same Affection as you?

It is absurd.

Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your family, and even your Wife and Children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wish to be so loved by your Friends, as from their excessive Affection, always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather wish, if it were possible, to have such a Kind of Affection from your Enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains, that your Behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely nothing that induced you to desert your Child?

How is that possible?

No: but it was some such Motive, as induced a Person at Rome to hide his Face while a Horse was running, to which he earnestly wished Success: and when, beyond his Expectation, it won the Race; he was obliged to have Recourse to Spunges, to recover his Senses.

And what was this Motive?

At present perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is sufficient to be convinced, (if what Philosophers say be true) that we are not to seek it from without: but that there is universally one and the same Cause, which moves us to do or forbear any Action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue: that very Cause which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it any thing else, than that it seemed right to us to do so?

Nothing else.

And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what should we have done else than what we thought right? This, and not the Death of Patroclus, was the Cause of Lamentation to Achilles, (for every Man is not thus affected by the Death of a Friend) that it seemed right to him. This too was the Cause of your running away from your Child, that it seemed right and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seemed right. You are now returning to Rome, because it seems right to you: but if you should alter your Opinion, you will not return. In a word neither Death, nor Exile, nor Pain, nor any thing of this Kind, is the Cause of our doing, or not doing, any Action: but our Opipions and Principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

3. Well then such as the Cause is, such will be the Effect. From this Day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the Principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the Roots, with greater Care than we would Wens and Tumours from the Body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right, to the same Cause: and we will accuse neither Servant, nor Neighbour, nor Wife, nor Children, as the Causes of any Evils to ns; persuaded, that if we had not such Principles, such Consequences would not follow. Of these Principles we ourselves, and not Externals, are the Masters.

Agreed.

From this Day, then, we will neither consider nor enquire of what Sort, or in what Condition, any thing is our Estate, or Slaves, or Horses, or Dogs, but only our Principles.

I wish to do it.

You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a Scholar: that Kind of Animal which every one laughs at; if you really desire to make an Examination of your Principles. But this, as you are sensible, is not the Work of an Hour or a Day.