All the Works of Epictetus · 19 of 100

Book I, Chapter 17

1. Since it is Reason which sets in order and finishes all other Things, it ought not itself to be left in Disorder. But by what shall it be set in Order?

Evidently, either by itself, or by something else.

Well: either that too is Reason, or there is something else superior to Reason (which is impossible): and, if it be Reason, what, again, shall set that in Order? For, if Reason can set itself in Order in one Case, it can in another and, if we will still require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without End.

But, the more urgent Necessity is to cure [our Opinions, Passions], and the like.

Would you hear about these, therefore? Well: hear. But then, if you should say to me, "I cannot tell whether your Arguments are true or false;" and if I should happen to express myself doubtfully, and you should say, "distinguish [which Sense you mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own Words upon you; the more urgent Necessity is, &c. Therefore, I suppose, the Art of Reasoning is first settled: just as, before the Measuring of Corn, we settle the Measure. For, unless we first determine what a Bushel, and what a Balance, is, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present Case: unless we have first learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the Criterion of other Things, and by which other Things are learnt, how shall we be able accurately to learn any thing else? And how is it possible? Well: a Bushel, however, is only Wood, a Thing of no Value [in itself]: but it measures Corn. And Logic [you say] is of no Value in itself. That we will consider hereafter. Let us, for the present, then, make the Concession. It is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other Things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And doth not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written, That the Beginning of a right Education is the Examination of Words? Doth not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, doth Xenophon write, That he began by the Examination of Words; what each signified.

2. Is this, then, the great and admirable Thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus?

Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable Thing?

To understand the Will of Nature.

Well then: do you apprehend it of yourself? In that Case, what Need have you for any one else? For, if it be true, that Men never err but involuntarily; and you have learnt the Truth, you must necessarily act right.

But, indeed, I do not apprehend the Will of Nature.

Who, then, shall interpret that?

They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this Interpreter of Nature says. I begin not to understand his Meaning. I seek one to interpret that. Here explain how this is expressed, and as if it were put into Latin. How, then, doth a supercilious Self-opinion belong to the Interpreter!

Indeed, it doth not justly belong to Chrysippus himself, if he only interprets the Will of Nature, and doth not follow it: and much less to his Interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus, on his own Account; but that, by his Means, we may apprehend the Will of Nature: nor do we need a Diviner on his own Account; but that, by his Assistance, we hope to understand future Events, and what is signified by the Gods: nor the Entrails of the Victims, on their own Account; but, on the Account of what is signified by them: neither is it the Raven, or the Crow, that we admire; but the God, who delivers his Significations by their Means. I come, therefore, to the Diviner and Interpreter of these Things; and say, "Inspect the Entrails for me: what is signified to me?" Having taken, and laid them open, he thus interprets them. You have a Choice, Man, incapable of being restrained or compelled. 'This is written here in the Entrails. I will show you this first, in the Faculty of Assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to Truth? —— "No one." —— Can any one compel you to admit a Falshood? —— "No one." —— You see, then, that you have in this Topic a Choice incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well: is it any otherwise with regard to Pursuit and Desire? What can conquer one Pursuit? —— "Another Pursuit." —— "What, Desire and Aversion? "Another Desire and another Aversion." If you set Death before me (say you) you compel me. No: not what is set before you doth it: but your Principle, that it is better to do such or such a thing, than to die. Here, again, you see it is your own Principle which compels you: that is, Choice compels Choice. For, if God hath constituted that Portion which he hath separated from his own Essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself, or by any other, he would not have been God; nor have taken care of us, in a due manner.

3. These Things, says the Diviner, I find in the Victims. These Things are signified to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of; no one to accuse. All will be equally according to your own Mind, and to the Mind of God.

4. For the Sake of this Oracle, I go to the Diviner and the Philosopher: admiring not him merely on the Account of his Interpretation, but the Things which he interprets.