All the Works of Epictetus · 27 of 100
Book I, Chapter 25
1. If these Things are true; and we are not stupid, or acting a Part, when we say, that the Good or Ill of Man consists in Choice, and that all besides is nothing to us; why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What hath been our Concern, is in no one's Power: what is in the Power of others, we do not regard. What Embarassment have we left?
But direct me.
Why should I direct you? Hath not Jupiter directed you? Hath he not given you what is your own, Incapable of Restraint, or Hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What Directions, then, what Orders, have you brought from him? "By all Methods keep what is your own: what belongs to others, do not covet. Honesty, is your own: a Sense of virtuous Shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of there? Who can restrain you from making use of them, but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your Concern which is not your own, you lose what is." Having such Precepts and Directions from Jupiter, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than He? More worthy of Credit? If you observe these, what others do you need? Or are not these Directions his? Produce your natural Preconceptions: produce the Demonstrations of Philosophers: produce what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself; what you have read, and what you have studied.
How long is it right to observe these Things, and not break up the Game?
As long as it goes on agreeably. A King is chosen at the Saturnalian Festival (for it was agreed to play at that Game): he orders; "Do you drink: you mix the Wine: you sing: you go: you come." I obey; that the Game may not be broken up by my Fault. —— "Well: but I bid you think yourself to be unhappy." I do not think so: and who shall compel me to think so? Again: we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon, says to me; "Go to Achilles, and force away Briseis." I go. "Come." I come.
2. We should converse in Life as we do in hypothetical Arguments. "Suppose it to be Night." —— Well: suppose it. —— "Is it Day, then?" No: for I admitted the Hypothesis, that it is Night. —— "Suppose, that you think it to be Night." —— Well: suppose it. —— But think also, in reality, that it is Night." —— That doth not follow from the Hypothesis. Thus, too, in the other Case. Suppose you have ill Luck. —— Suppose it, —— "Are you, then, unlucky?" —— Yes. —— "Have you some cross Demon." —— Yes. —— "Well: but think too [in earnest], that you are unhappy." —— This doth not follow from the Hypothesis: and there is one who forbids me [to think so].
How long, then, are we to obey such Orders? As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preserve what is becoming and fit.
3. Further: some are peevish and fastidious; and say, I cannot dine with such a Fellow, to be obliged to hear him all Day recounting, how he fought in Mysia. "I told you, my Friend, how I gained the Eminence. There I am besieged again." But another says, "I had rather get a Dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases."
Do you compare the Value of these Things, and judge for yourself: but do not let it be with Depression, and Anxiety; and with a Supposition, that you are unhappy: for no one compels you to that. Is the House in a Smoke? If it be a moderate one, I will stay: If a very great one, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the Door is open, "Well: do not live at Nicopolis." —— I will not live there. —— "Nor at Athens." —— Well: nor at Athens. —— "Nor at Rome." —— Nor at Rome neither. —— "But you shall live at Gyaros." —— I will live there. But living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great Smoke, I will retire where no one can forbid me to live; (for that Abode is open to all) and put off my last Garment, this paultry Body of mine: beyond this, no one hath any Power over me. Thus Demetrius said to Nero; "You sentence me to Death; and Nature, you;" If I place my Admiration on Body, I give myself up for a Slave: if on an Estate, the same: for I immediately betray myself, how I may be taken. Just as when a Snake pulls in his Head, I say strike that Part of him which he guards: and be you as sured, that whatever you shew a Desire to guard, there your Master will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter, or fear?
But I want to sit where the Senators do.
Do not you see, that by this you straiten yourself? You squeeze yourself?
Why, how else shall I see the Show, in the Amphitheatre cleverly?
Do not see it [at all], Man; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself Trouble? Or wait a little while; and when the Show is over, go sit in the Senators Places, and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally; we squeeze ourselves; we straiten ourselves: that is; our own Principles squeeze and straiten us. What is it to be reviled, for Instance? Stand by a Stone, and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefore, would hear like a Stone, what would your Reviler be the better? But, if the Reviler hath the Weakness of the Reviled for an Advantage-ground, then he carries his Point. —— "Strip him." "What do you mean by him? " "Take my Clothes; strip off them [if you will]." —— "I have put an Affront upon you." —— "Much Good may it do you."
$. 4. These Things were the Study of Socrates; and, by this means, he always preserved the same Countenance. But we had rather exercise and study any thing, than how to become unrestrained and free.
The Philosophers talk Paradoxes.
And are there not Paradoxes in other Arts? What is more paradoxical, than the pricking any one's Eye, to make him see? If a Person was to tell this to one ignorant of Surgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the Wonder then, if, in Philosophy too, many Truths appear Paradoxes to the Ignorant?