All the Works of Epictetus

All the Works of Epictetus · Epictetus

Book II, Chapter 11

Translated by Elizabeth Carter · 43 of 100

1. The Beginning of Philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper Way, and by the Door, is a Consciousness of our own Weakness, and Inability, in necessary Things. For we came into the World without any natural Idea of a right-angled Triangle; of a Diesis, or a Hemitone, in Music: but we learn each of these Things by some Instruction of Art. Hence, they who do not understand them, do not form any Conceit of understanding them. But who ever came into the World, without an innate Idea of Good and Evil; Fair and Base; Becoming and Unbecoming; Happiness and Misery; Proper and Improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence we all make use of the Names, and endeavor to apply our Preconceptions to particular Cases. "Such a one hath acted well; not well: right; not right: is unhappy; is happy: is just; is unjust." Who of us refrains from these Names? Who defers the Use of them, till he had learnt it; as those do, who are ignorant of Lines and Sounds? The Reason of this is, that we come instructed, in some degree, by Nature upon these Subjects; and from this Beginning, we go on to add Self-conceit. "For why, say you, should not I know what Fair and Base is? Have not I the Idea of it?" You have. "Do not I apply this Idea to Particulars?" You do. "Do not I apply it right, then?" Here lies the whole Question; and here arises the Self-conceit. For, beginning from these acknowledged Points, Men proceed to what is in Dispute, by means of their unsuitable Application. For, if they possest a right Method of Application, what would restrain them from being perfect? Now, since you think, that you make a suitable Application, of your Preconceptions, to particular Cases, tell me whence you derive this.

From its seeming so to me.

But it doth not seem so to another: and doth not he too form a Conceit, that he makes a right Application?

He doth.

Is it possible, then, that each of you should apply your Pre-conceptions right, on the very Subjects about which you have contradictory Opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to show us, then, for this Application, preferable to its seeming so to you? And doth a Madman act any otherwise than seems to him, right? Is this then a sufficient Criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come therefore, to something preferable to what seems.

What is that?

2. The Beginning of Philosophy is this: The being sensible of the Disagreement of Men with each other: an Inquiry into the Cause of this Disagreement; and a Disapprobation, and Distrust of what merely seems: a certain Examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly: and an Invention of some Rule, like a Balance, for the Determination of Weights; like a Square, for strait and crooked.

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Is this the Beginning of Philosophy, that all Things, which seem right to all Persons, are so?

Why; is it possible, that Contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all Things; but all that seem so to us.

And why more to you, than to the Syrians, or Egyptians? Then to me, or to any other Man?

Not at all more.

3. Therefore [merely] what seems to each Man, is not sufficient to determine the Reality of a Thing. For even in Weights or Measures we are not satisfied with the bare Appearance; but for every thing we find some Rule. And is there, in the present Case then, no Rule, preferable to what seems? Is it possible, that what is of the greatest Necessity in human Life, should be left incapable of Determination and Discovery?

There is, then, some Rule.

And why do we not seek, and discover it; and, when we have discovered, make use of it, without fail, ever after, so as not even to move a Finger, without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their Madness, who make use of no other Measure, but their own perverted Way of Thinking. That afterwards, begin ning from certain known and determinate Points, we may make use of Preconceptions, properly applied to Particulars. What is the Subject that falls under our Inquiry?

Pleasure.

Bring it to the Rule. Throw it into the Scale. Must Good be something in which it is fit to confide? and to which we may trust?

Yes.

Is it fit to trust to any thing unsteady?

No.

Is Pleasure then, a steady Thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the Scale, and drive it far distant from the Place of good Things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one Balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by Good?

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Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present Pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a Scale. Thus are Things judged, and weighed, when we have the Rules ready. This is the Part of Philosophy, To examine, and fix the Rules: and to make use of them, when they are known, is the Business of a wise and good Man.

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Book II, Chapter 12

1. What Things are to be learn'd, in order to the right Use of Reason, the Philosophers of our Sect have accurately taught: but we are altogether unpracticed in the due Application of them.

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Contents

All the Works of Epictetus · Epictetus

100 chapters

  1. 01Introduction32 min
  2. 02Preface: Arrian to Lucius Gellius2 min
  3. 03Book I, Chapter 15 min
  4. 04Book I, Chapter 26 min
  5. 05Book I, Chapter 32 min
  6. 06Book I, Chapter 45 min
  7. 07Book I, Chapter 52 min
  8. 08Book I, Chapter 67 min
  9. 09Book I, Chapter 75 min
  10. 10Book I, Chapter 83 min
  11. 11Book I, Chapter 96 min
  12. 12Book I, Chapter 103 min
  13. 13Book I, Chapter 117 min
  14. 14Book I, Chapter 126 min
  15. 15Book I, Chapter 131 min
  16. 16Book I, Chapter 143 min
  17. 17Book I, Chapter 152 min
  18. 18Book I, Chapter 164 min
  19. 19Book I, Chapter 175 min
  20. 20Book I, Chapter 185 min
  21. 21Book I, Chapter 195 min
  22. 22Book I, Chapter 203 min
  23. 23Book I, Chapter 211 min
  24. 24Book I, Chapter 224 min
  25. 25Book I, Chapter 232 min
  26. 26Book I, Chapter 244 min
  27. 27Book I, Chapter 255 min
  28. 28Book I, Chapter 263 min
  29. 29Book I, Chapter 274 min
  30. 30Book I, Chapter 285 min
  31. 31Book I, Chapter 2911 min
  32. 32Book I, Chapter 302 min
  33. 33Book II, Chapter 17 min
  34. 34Book II, Chapter 24 min
  35. 35Book II, Chapter 32 min
  36. 36Book II, Chapter 43 min
  37. 37Book II, Chapter 56 min
  38. 38Book II, Chapter 65 min
  39. 39Book II, Chapter 73 min
  40. 40Book II, Chapter 85 min
  41. 41Book II, Chapter 94 min
  42. 42Book II, Chapter 105 min
  43. 43Book II, Chapter 114 min left
  44. 44Book II, Chapter 124 min
  45. 45Book II, Chapter 136 min
  46. 46Book II, Chapter 146 min
  47. 47Book II, Chapter 154 min
  48. 48Book II, Chapter 169 min
  49. 49Book II, Chapter 177 min
  50. 50Book II, Chapter 185 min
  51. 51Book II, Chapter 197 min
  52. 52Book II, Chapter 208 min
  53. 53Book II, Chapter 215 min
  54. 54Book II, Chapter 227 min
  55. 55Book II, Chapter 239 min
  56. 56Book II, Chapter 246 min
  57. 57Book II, Chapter 251 min
  58. 58Book II, Chapter 262 min
  59. 59Book III, Chapter 19 min
  60. 60Book III, Chapter 24 min